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ABSTRACT
This research aims to answer a simple question: Why are some individuals, and some
states, more willing to extend protections to same-sex couples than are others? Drawing from the
literature, I perform a battery of quantitative tests on variables most commonly associated with
gay rights and gay marriage policy development: liberalism, education, age, religiosity,
authoritarianism, tolerance, urbanization, and moral traditionalism. While I find that all of these
variables have a relationship with gay rights and gay marriage opinion, I argue that those
associated with religiosity have the strongest pull. However, religiosity does not act alone; moral
traditionalism, age, and ideology play particularly robust roles as well. In conclusion, I contend
that the data show a strong likelihood for the continued liberalization of gay rights and gay
marriage policy into the foreseeable future.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
There are few issues in the United States as salient and divisive as same-sex marriage. Though
the concept of allowing persons of the same sex to wed is a relatively recent development — in
fact, until the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 14 states and Puerto
Rico prohibited sodomy (either all sodomy or only homosexual sodomy), a far cry from
sanctioning same-sex relationships (Gay and Lesbian Archives of the Pacific Northwest 2007) —
it became pervasive in American politics in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
As of this writing, five states permit same-sex couples full marriage rights:
Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Iowa (Gardner 2009). (Washington,
D.C. also began issuing gay couples marriage licenses in March 2010 (Ramstack 2010).) Two
more, California and Maine, have extended marriage rights to same-sex couples, only to have
voter referenda revoke those rights (Gardner 2009; Dolan 2009). Still eight more states afford
same-sex couples a lesser degree of recognition, such as civil unions or domestic partnership
registries (Lambda Legal 2009). And yet, some 37 states have forbidden gay and lesbian couples
from marrying, either in statute or in state constitutions, and sometimes in both (DOMA Watch
2009). In all 31 instances where the gay marriage question has been put to voters via referenda,
gay marriage opponents have prevailed (Gardner 2009).
Across the globe, other countries deal with homosexuality and its related issues in
staggeringly different ways. In some corners there is widespread, often brutal oppression of gay
men and lesbians. As of May 2008, seven Islamic states, for instance, consider homosexual
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activity a capital offense1, and 76 other states across Africa, Asia and Central and South America
criminalize same-sex intimacy, and sometimes punish it with lengthy prison terms (ILGA 2008).
Until July 2009, homosexuality was a crime in India, even though “Hindu festivals and sects
which celebrate homosexual acts, the description of sodomy in the Kama Sutra ... and the
description of Tantric initiation rites which evoked the idea of universal bisexuality in human
personality are discussed widely” (Joseph 1996: 2228; also, see Bolcer 2009). Gay sex is a crime
in Egypt, where “men suspected of engaging in ’debauchery’ ... are subjected to anal
examinations at the hands of the Forensic Medical Authority” that are “invasive, intrusive,
abusive and a form of torture” (Long 2004:114).
Meanwhile, Western societies have grown increasingly tolerant of gays and lesbians in
recent decades. Throughout Europe gay sex is a legal behavior. Scandinavian countries and
Poland first decriminalized homosexuality in the 1930s and 1940s2. England and Wales did so in
1967, and decriminalization spread across the continent over the next two decades (for a
complete time line, see Sanders 1996: 71). In 1981, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) struck down Northern Ireland’s prohibition of same-sex relations as a violation of “the
right to respect for private life.” In 1994, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for
equal treatment of gays and lesbians, including the right to marriage and adoption (Sanders 1996:

1 Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen, Sudan, Nigeria and Mauritania (ILGA 2008). There have also been claims that
the Iraqi government planned to execute 128 homosexuals (see Iraq LGBT 2009). Recently, a proposal in the
Ugandan legislature to make homosexual behavior a potentially capital crime has drawn the ire of Western gayrights groups, particularly considering the connection between the Ugandan legislator who proposed the bill’s
connection with American fundamentalist Christians (The Advocate 2009).
2 States that derived their criminal law from Napoleonic Code, such as France and Spain, “drew no distinction
between homosexual and heterosexual acts” and thus had no prohibitions against homosexual activity (Sanders
1996: 70).
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78-79, 83). In 1999, the ECHR ruled that the UK’s ban on gays serving in the military violated
the European Convention on Human Rights (Lau 2004: 1701). In 2000, pressure from European
states pushed Romania, a predominantly Orthodox country that in the 1990s punished
homosexuality with up to five years in prison, to decriminalize private same-sex sexual behavior
(Turcuscu and Stan 2005: 294). As Holning Lau (2004: 1701-1702) succinctly states, “European
states lead the world in sexual orientation law reform.”
Nowhere is that more true that with same-sex marriage. In 1989, Denmark became the
first country to grant homosexual couples legal recognition (Festy and Rogers 2002: 419). In
2000 and 2003, respectively, the Netherlands and Belgium became the first countries to offer
same-sex couples full marriage rights (Fiorini 2003: 1039). Since then, five more countries —
Spain, Canada, South Africa, Norway and Sweden — have done the same. Worldwide, at least
two dozen more countries and sub-national governments offer same-sex couples some level of
legal recognition, such the United Kingdom’s registered partnership scheme and the pactes civil
de solidarite in France (see Nyberg 2009; Paternotte 2006 and 2009; ILGA-Europe 2009; and
UK Gay News 2009). In 2003, Belgian and Dutch same-sex marriages won legal recognition
throughout the European Union (Rothblum 2005: 23).
But even while gay marriage rights spread throughout Europe, the fight over the
recognitions of these same relationships intensified in the US. In 1996, the US Congress passed,
and President Bill Clinton signed, the Defense of Marriage Act, prohibiting any federal
recognition of same-sex couples (Tracey 2009). After its state Supreme Court ruled that the state
constitution required equal access to the institution of marriage for same-sex couples,
3

Massachusetts permitted same-sex couples to wed in 2004 (Arce 2004); in the media storm that
followed, gay marriage became a lightning rod in the 2004 presidential election, to the benefit of
Republican President George W. Bush, who advocated for a federal constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage. As Miriam Smith (2003: 226) notes, “In the US, the ’legality’ opens
the door to wholesale condemnation of homosexuality in public discourse....”3
All of this demonstrates a central point: In postmaterialist Western cultures, there is a
wide divergence in states’ and countries’ approaches to lesbian and gay rights. And while the
policy differences between the Netherlands and the United States (and, perhaps, the differences
between Connecticut and Texas) are certainly smaller than the differences between, say, the
Netherlands and Saudi Arabia4, the fact remains that even within developed, prosperous,
democratic countries and states with relatively similar cultural and religious heritages, we see
disparities in the rights allotted gay and lesbian couples. For instance, while homosexuality is
legal throughout Europe — thanks largely to the institutions of the EU — some countries, such
as the Netherlands and Belgium, grant gay and lesbian couples full marriage rights; others, such
as Greece and Italy, grant them none. Still others, including the UK and France, afford same-sex
couples a lesser legal recognition than marriage. Why do these countries adopt these different
policies? Similarly, in the US — which will be the primary focus of this research, although there

3 As Smith and Howard-Hassman separately point out, this was not the case in Canada, a country that
decriminalized homosexuality in 1969 — after its justice minister declared in 1967, “The state has no place in
the bedroom of the nation” (Howard-Hassman 2001: 77) —and approved gay marriage in 2005. Whereas in the
US, Republican leaders cued their political message to their anti-gay base, Smith argues that “in the Canadian
debate ... same-sex marriage is treated as a question of human rights” (Smith 2003: 226).
4 One could fairly chalk up the more draconian opposition to homosexual civil rights in the Middle East as a
product of fundamentalist religion and theocratic nation-states, or as a remnant of materialist concerns (see
Inglehart 1981 for a fuller discussion of the effects of materialism and postmaterialism on cultural change).
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is an important literature and qualitative research on the European experience — what makes
such states as Massachusetts and Iowa, which permit same-sex unions, different from Florida and
Texas, which have constitutional proscriptions against gay marriage?
The next chapter of this thesis will delve into the literature on both gay marriage, which
is fairly nascent, and the gay-rights movement more broadly. This review will include not just the
political-science literature on the gay-rights movement and seminal scholastic works on gay
marriage, but also a brief historical review of the gay-rights movement in the United States and
Europe over the last 50 years to help contextualize the more recent gay-marriage debates. This
chapter will include studies on three western European nations’ gay-marriage policies as well as
descriptions of the state-specific battles of gay marriage in the US. It will conclude with a
theoretical overview and a list of hypotheses drawn from the literature.
Chapter 3 will focus on methodology. This research will rely primarily upon quantitative
data from American National Elections Studies, General Social Surveys and state-level data
compiled by Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips, and developed through multilevel regression
and poststratification — an innovative means of estimating state-level opinion that, Lax and
Phillips argue, does not carry with it the problems of disaggregation, the more common means of
determining state-level opinion data (Lax and Phillips 2009: 371-373), as well as state public
opinion polls and US Census and other demographic data.
Chapter 4 will present my research. In Chapter 5, I will discuss and analyze my findings.
In Chapter 6, I will conclude with some final thoughts on what this research contributes to the
literature, and what areas need further scholarly exploration.
5

Ultimately, this research aims to help explain the divergence in same-sex union (SSU) and gay
rights policy across the US, and to add to our understanding of why states adopt the policies they
do. These results have implications for advocates on both sides of the gay-rights debate; clearly,
understanding how policies come to be enacted and what variables are linked to policy changes
is vital to developing political strategies. But this research also has broader ramifications. Gay
marriage is a salient, divisive, almost defining issue in early twenty-first century American
politics. It is, as the literature review in the next chapter will show, front and center in the socalled culture wars. Developing a conception of the dynamics at play will lay the groundwork for
future scholarship, in this and other “culture war” fields.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on gay marriage is the US is a fairly new field; indeed, in the modern era, the
concept of allowing same-sex couples to wed anywhere is a relatively recent development.5 As
Kelly Kollman (2007:352) notes, this presents a problem for researchers, who are essentially
trying to build a model from scratch: “Because [same-sex unions] policy is such a new field,
very little research has been done on why different countries adopt the models they do.”
Kollman’s research in Europe presents perhaps the first quantitative effort to explain SSU
policy divergence, and as such, it offers a good starting point for this literature review. She
credits Western European countries’ overarching policy convergence on gay-rights issues with
“the rise of a human rights oriented transnational network of lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender (LGBT) activists as well as the transnational networked policy elites these activists
influence” (2007: 329). Kollman argues that SSU policy is largely elite-driven, and that the elitelevel adaptation of international human rights norms that include rights for homosexuals and
same-sex couples have in turn filtered down into national public policies. “This evidence taken
together with governments’ frequent use of international norms and foreign models in their
justifications of national SSU laws strongly suggests that these norms and transnational networks
have been an important catalyst of domestic SSU policy developments” (2007: 343)6.

5 This was not always so. As William Eskridge (1993) ably demonstrates, history is full of legally sanctioned
same-sex couples, including that of Sergius and Bacchus, two fourth-century Roman soldiers: “They were male
lovers, yet it was for their Christian faith that they were persecuted by the Romans” (1420). The Roman Empire
only grew hostile to homosexuals three decades after Constantine’s conversion to Christianity (1447). It was not
until the thirteenth century, Eskridge argues, that the church and Western secular governments began to fashion
anti-sodomy laws (1469).
6 This point is supported by David Patternotte’s (2006 and 2009) analyses of SSU-policy evolution in Belgium.
“Belgium is traditionally influenced by its neighbors,” he writes. “After the failure of the French PACS [civil

7

In Western European countries, Kollman attributes national SSU policy differences to
two primary factors: How “seriously governments take international and foreign norms in
general;” and countries’ religious characteristics and practices. On its own, the “international
norms” variable7 does not succeed. However, it does elucidate when considered alongside a
country’s religious characteristics — a country’s religiosity, dominant religious tradition and
church-state relationship (e.g. whether the state officially recognizes or subsidizes a church).
“Confessional heritage and church-state relations appear to have less impact on SSU outcomes”
(2007: 347).
As Kollman notes, when the US Supreme Court overturned anti-sodomy laws in 2003, a
mere mention of the European case law on the subject was enough to “raise the ire of
conservatives in Congress. Resolutions forbidding the use of foreign or international law in
judicial decisions were introduced in both the House and the Senate in the wake of the Lawrence
decision. … There is a deep-seated antipathy to the use of international legal principles and
precedents among many US political elites and the public, a reluctance that is much less visible
in Canada and Western Europe” (2007: 345-346). From this perspective, considering the US’s
relatively high levels of religiosity (2007: 348), it is perhaps unsurprising that the US has at a
national level (and in the overwhelming majority of states) an anti-SSU policy.
In looking at Western European countries, Kollman draws a noteworthy distinction
between those countries that have adopted marriage SSU policies and those who have opted for

unions] and the Dutch decision to allow same-sex marriage in 2000, the latter proposal became a valuable option
of both activists and politicians …” (2006).
7 She measures this variable in terms of participations in transnational treaties and finds little variance between
countries that offer same-sex couples legal recognitions and those that do not (2007: 346).
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lesser recognitions, such as civil unions. As one might expect, countries with low levels of
religiosity, as measured by frequency of church attendance, have a SSU law in place, while the
countries that do not tend to have high religiosity. However, she notes, among countries with a
SSU policy, those with medium and higher levels of religiosity tend to offer same-sex couples
marriage rights, while those with lower levels of religiosity choose civil union or domestic
partnership recognitions. “In comparatively traditional adopter societies, it seems governments
are more susceptible to the argument that denying same-sex couples the symbolism of marriage
amounts to discrimination” (2007: 354).
Also importantly, Kollman rejects institutional explanations, such as parliamentaryversus-presidential governments or the impact of proportional representation or single-member
districts8.
In a recently published book, M.V. Lee Badgett expands upon Kollman’s research and
offers the most thorough analysis of gay marriage in the US and Western Europe to date, from
both quantitative and qualitative perspectives.
Badgett, an economist who married her partner after her home state of Massachusetts
opened marriage to same-sex partners, tackles her research in two ways: First, she conducts a
series of interviews with same-sex couples in the Netherlands, probing them on their decisions to
marry (or, in some cases, not); second, she uses population and survey data to analyze the impact
that allowing same-sex couples to wed has on society at large9. The latter is more fundamental to

8 Her analysis finds no support for the theory that parliamentarian, PR systems tend towards more liberal SSU
policy.
9 This is perhaps the most poignant criticism that opponents of same-sex marriage levy. Indeed, conservative,
religious activists such as Mathew Staver (2004), Maggie Gallagher Janet Folger, and Tony Perkins contend that
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my research.
Specifically, she answers contentions by conservative scholar Stanley Kurtz, who has
argued — and whose arguments high-ranking American politicians have taken up — that “gay
marriage is both an effect and a cause of the increasing separation of marriage and parenthood”
(Kurtz in Badgett 2009: 65). Hence, he concludes that giving marriage rights to same-sex
couples is potentially devastating for the traditional heterosexual family. Looking at time-series
data, Badgett argues that gay marriage cannot be blamed for such things: “Overall, the most
basic elements of the sky-is-falling argument fail these basic tests of plausibility,” she writes.
“The timing in measured trends of heterosexual behavior does not line up with the timing of
changes in policies that recognized same-sex couples’ right to marry or register a partnership.
These trends were well established in the 1970s and 1980s, and no adverse changes have
occurred since countries recognized rights for same-sex couples: marriage rates are up, divorce
rates are down, and (mostly) non-marital birthrates are not rising in comparison to rates for the
years before gay couples could register” (2009: 76)10.

permitting same-sex marriage means, in Gallagher’s words, “losing the idea that children need mothers and
fathers” (see Badgett 2009: 5-6). They tend to view homosexuality as “a destructive lifestyle both physically and
emotionally,” and societal acceptance may not only incur the wrath of God, but lead to the degeneration of the
traditional family structure that they see as being the core of Western civilization (Staver 2004: 10). The point is
no small matter in the debate over the liberalization of gay rights policies, particularly with regards to marriage.
Ostensibly, this argument can be made without a religious component, and instead, focus on the secular, and
statistical, effect that liberal SSU policies have on heterosexual families. If a deleterious effect can be
demonstrated, in terms of increased rates of divorce or out-of-wedlock, to be correlated with a liberal policy
toward gay marriage, then this is another arrow in SSU opponents’ rhetorical quiver. That said, even this
argument would present an endogeneity problem — whether these factors precipitated or were caused by gay
marriage — which is part of the puzzle that Badgett sets out to answer here.
10 This is not to say that the embrace of gay marriage policies would have no impact on society as a whole. There
are in fact numerous legal ramifications to such a policy change, particularly to religious groups that, for
instance, may be required in some cases to accept these unions despite their religious tenets in order to keep their
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This conclusion is key to my hypothesis development in this way: If gay marriage does
not cause a deterioration of these statistical elements that are linked to the traditional family
structure — divorce, marriage, and non-marital birthrates, etc. — then perhaps gay marriage may
be better viewed as a symptom. In other words, as traditional family structures decline in an
increasingly urbanized, less religious, postmaterialist societal framework, allowing same-sex
couples to wed or register their relationships becomes more culturally acceptable.
Badgett, in fact, touches on this concept, and points to the World Values Survey’s
question on whether or not marriage is outdated (2009: 83). “If giving rights to same-sex couples
undermines the relevance and attractiveness of marriage, then the proportion of respondents who
see marriage as outdated should increase more in countries with such laws than in countries
without them [italics sic],” Badgett writes. “… The countries without partnerships saw a faster
rise in the proportion those who saw marriage as outdated, though. … This finding contradicts
the prediction that recognizing same-sex couples will somehow undermine marriage in the minds
of heterosexual people” (2009: 84).
As my research focuses on the individual and societal prerequisites for the liberalization
of SSU policies, Badgett’s work helpfully identifies a number of important factors, including:
From an institutional perspective, the eight countries in her study that recognize same-sex
couples all have parliamentary governments that set family policy at the national level; the
presence of an organized gay- and lesbian-rights movement; the existence of legal precursors,
such as antidiscrimination laws; a political impetus, such as the recognition that homosexuals

nonprofit status. For a fuller discussion of these possibilities, see Laycock et. al 2008.
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require legal protections; and left-leaning governments (2009: 182-186). Badgett also links
greater visibility of the gay community (which she quantifies through a gay business index), a
higher heterosexual cohabitation rate, higher social spending, lower religiosity, higher tolerance,
higher percentages of union members, and stronger levels of gay organization to liberalized SSU
policies (2009:191).
In the US, Badgett analyzes the 10 states that sanctioned, in some form, same-sex
relationships as of August 200811. Of these, nine of the 10 display levels of cohabitation,
tolerance, and religiosity similar to those of the first wave of European countries that extended
legal recognitions to same-sex couples. (New Jersey is the exception; it has high tolerance and
low levels of evangelical adherents, but has a relatively lower level of cohabitation). Badgett
identifies another 11 states — 21 in total, including Washington, D.C. — that, based on her three
criteria, seem predisposed toward recognizing same-sex relationships12.
“The similarities in the path to change in European countries and in the United States
suggest that both practical and political factors are driving the policies that grant marriage or
partnership rights to gay couples,” she concludes. “From this broad perspective, the movement to
give legal recognition to same-sex couples is not racing ahead of social values or being foisted
on an unprepared public by activist judges” (2009: 198).
11 These were: Massachusetts and Connecticut (marriage); Vermont, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Oregon (civil
unions or domestic partnerships); Hawaii, Washington, and Maine (lesser rights packages); Washington, D.C.
also afforded gay couples domestic partnership rights. New York is not included in this group for Badgett’s
purposes — though it does not permit same-sex couples to marry inside of its borders, it does recognize samesex marriages performed in other states (Badgett 2009: 198)). Also, since her writing, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Iowa, California and Maine extended marriage rights to same-sex couples, though California and Maine voters
later repealed these rights via referenda.
12 These are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin.
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In their important work, Lax and Phillips (2009) buttress this point. Their analysis of
states’ policy congruence with public opinion finds a high degree of responsiveness, particularly
after controlling for legislator ideology and the presence of interest groups. In general, they argue
that state institutions deliver more liberal policies to liberal states, and more conservative policies
to conservative states (2009: 382). This is not necessarily as intuitive as it sounds, particularly
considering the oft-stated concern of conservative activists that “judicial activists” will impose
unwanted liberal policies on an unwilling electorate (see Marshall et. al. 2008 for one of many
examples). Indeed, judicial decisions in California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Iowa have
led to gay marriage (though voters later repealed the California gay-marriage law the legislature
passed in response to the court ruling).
Just as Kollman found little support for institutional explanations for policy divergence in
Europe, Lax and Phillips conclude that there is “little evidence that state political institutions
affect policy responsiveness or congruence” (2009: 367). Interestingly, when there is
noncongruence between policy and public opinion, they find that it “is in the conservative
direction. Majority will is not trumped by pro-gay elites — rather, opinion and policy are
disconnected in a way that works against the interests of gays and lesbians. In other words, we
do not find any evidence suggesting a consistent pro-gay bias in policy making, as is often
argued by opponents of gay rights” (2009: 383). Importantly, they find that the policy
preferences of religious conservatives are “overrepresented,” in that “their share of the
population shapes policy even beyond directly affecting public opinion and the composition of
state governments” (2009: 383).
13

These points are key: If policies are generally responsive to opinion, then we can use
individual-level data, such as ANES surveys, to look into the questions of why states opt for
different policies. Second, if religious conservatives are in fact overrepresented, as Lax and
Phillips indicate, then it will be important to identify both the percentage of religious
conservatives and their clout in my analysis.
Marc J. Hetherington and Jonathan D. Weiler’s (2009) research on authoritarianism in
modern American politics is also vital to developing theoretical conceptions of policy divergence
within states. “Those who score high in authoritarianism tend to have a different cognitive style
than those who score low,” they write. “The former tend to view the world in more concrete,
black and white terms. This is probably because they have a greater than average need for order.
In contrast, those who score low in authoritarianism have more comfort with ambiguous shades
of gray, which allow for more nuanced judgments” (2009: 3).
This preference for order, Hetherington and Weiler’s research suggest, leads to not just
anti-gay and anti-black policy preferences, but also “military conflict over diplomacy and
protecting security over preserving civil liberties. A preference for order and a need to minimize
ambiguity connects both impulses” (2009: 4). While those who score high in authoritarianism
tend to perceive threats to stability and order, both from minority groups and in terms of foreign
affairs, perpetually, the positions of those who score low in authoritarianism tend to mimic those
with higher scored once they perceive threat, such as after a terrorist attack (2009: 7-8). These
individuals’ policy preferences are willing likely to change as “threats” to social cohesion ebb
and flow — including perceived physical threats, such as terrorist attacks, or perceived threats to
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the social order, from such things as gay marriage or, perhaps, race-related issues (2009: 119).
“The underlying orientation that structures all these things — race, morals, and
hawkishness — is authoritarianism,” they write (2009: 29). Taking data from the ANES, they
show that authoritarianism levels are highest among evangelical protestants, frequent
churchgoers, individuals with lower education levels, and those from small towns and rural
areas, as opposed to those from larger cities (2009: 59). Thus, we would expect that individuals
that fall into these categories would be less likely to have affect for gays and lesbians, and lower
levels of support for gay marriage.
Over the last decade, Hetherington and Weiler write, gay rights, and gay marriage
particularly, have become salient issues in American politics. “The rise of gay rights from a
nonissue to a central issue threatens one set of traditional values and taps into authoritarians’
concerns about difference” (2009: 86). And indeed, ANES data show a clear link between levels
of authoritarianism and support for gay adoption, gay marriage, gays in the military, and job
discrimination protections for gays and lesbians. For instance, they write, while 71 percent of
those who score lowest in authoritarianism approve of gay marriage; only 19 percent of those
who score highest in authoritarianism do so (2009: 92). These levels hold up under more
rigorous statistical scrutiny.
“In sum, the relationship between authoritarianism and support for gay rights holds up
even when we control for a wide range of other potential explanatory factors,” they conclude.
“Moreover, the effect of authoritarianism is very large in a relative sense. It is consistently larger
than that of partisanship and ideological self-identification, as well as all the demographic
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variables” (2009: 97)13.

The evolution of the gay rights movement
While the literature on SSU policy development is a nascent field, the research on the
broader topic of gay rights — and the correlating history of the gay rights movement in the US
and Western Europe — is significantly more robust, and furthers our understanding of why states
and countries choose the policies related to LGBT individuals and couples that they do, and as
such is worthy of review.
As Badgett notes, the history of marriage has not always been tied to love and
procreation. Instead, marriage was often about formalizing property arrangements or linking
powerful families. “Not until recently did marriage become more about love than about property
and in-laws,” she writes. “In the twentieth century, as people have lived longer and spent less of
their coupled lives raising children and as economic forces have made both spouses’ paid labor
increasingly essential, family life and family law have also adapted” (2009: 66).
The theoretical notion that the liberalization of gay rights policy is a reflection of a larger
societal movement favoring the individual over the traditional family structure appears
throughout the literature. It tracks with Inglehart’s concept of postmaterialism (see Inglehart
1981) — in sum, that the transformation of economies away from satisfying basic needs also

13 Hetherington and Weiler base their authoritarianism index on an ANES question that asks respondents to judge
attractive attributes in children: respect for elders versus independence; obedience versus self-reliance; curiosity
versus good manners; and being well behaved versus being considerate (2009: 48). In my later tests on
authoritarianism, I do not seek to replicate their work. Instead, I construct indexes based on variables that the
authoritarianism conception would expect to find associated with low gay rights support, such as tolerance and
hawkishness.
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transforms societal focuses beyond these needs, and into more abstract, non-materialistic
concepts. Thus, a brief review of the evolution of GLBT rights is in order.
The gay-rights movement arcs back to late-nineteenth century Germany, where the
Scientific Humanitarian Committee fought a law that made adult male homosexuality a crime.
As Ronald J. Hunt details, “From its inception in 1897 until its demise in 1933, with the
ransacking of its headquarters by fascist youth, the Scientific Humanitarian Committee and the
coalition of groups which it spearheaded created the first broad-based political movement for the
emancipation of lesbians and gays from repressive laws and social intolerance” (1992: 222). A
larger-scale acceptance of homosexuality in Europe did not come until the latter half the
twentieth century, following the publication of the 1957 Wolfenden Report in the UK, which
described homosexuality as a moral, not criminal matter, and led to that country’s
decriminalization of same-sex sexuality. In 1981, the ECHR effectively banned European
countries from prohibiting homosexuality. By that time, the march towards European
liberalization of gay-rights policy was well underway (Sanders 1996: 70; also, Hunt 1992: 220).
In the US, the gay-rights movement got its start about 1950 — although the first gayrights organization dates back to 1924 — with the Mattachine Society (Marcus 2002: 4). In the
1950s and throughout the early years of the gay rights movement, homosexuals were among the
most despised groups in the country. They were so despised, in fact, that the American Civil
Liberties Union supported anti-gay discrimination. A Truman administration document asserted
that the public considered homosexuals a greater threat than communists (Lewis 1997: 389). In
California, oral sex carried a prison sentence of up to 14 years (although this penalty was applied
17

almost exclusively to gay men) (Marcus 2002: 38).
The 1950s also saw a federal government crackdown on homosexuals within the civil
service, although there had been a number of discharges of known homosexuals before this,
including the Interior Department’s termination of Walt Whitman in 1865. In 1947, a US Senate
subcommittee sent the State Department of list of “admitted homosexuals and suspected
perverts” (Lewis 1997: 387-388).
“During the Cold War, Congress and the president strengthened prohibitions on federal
employment of gay men and lesbians, whom they deemed to be risks to national security,”
Gregory W. Lewis (1997: 387) writes. This ban was in place until the 1970s, and it was not until
1980 that the Office of Personnel Management forbade discrimination based upon sexual
orientation. In the years after World War II, as the country moved to reestablish pre-war family
and moral norms, state and local governments were passing similar regulations. Licensing boards
restricted homosexuals from similar occupations, and private employers banned homosexuals
officially or unofficially. Overall, lesbians and gay men were officials barred from at least 20
percent of the nation’s jobs” (Lewis 1997: 389).
Newspapers and politicos also reflected the cultural hostility toward gays and lesbians:
“Politicians, for the most part, ignored lesbian and gay constituents. Newspapers, rather than
publicizing protests and writing editorials in support of the gay community, made a habit of
printing the names and addresses of those arrested in routine police raids of gay bars” (Fetner
2001: 411-412).
The 1969 Stonewall riots in New York City proved a galvanizing moment for the
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movement (Sanders 1996: 70; also, Hunt 1992: 220). Between 1969 and 1973, some 800 gayrights organizations emerged, whereas before there might have been 50 (D’Emilio 2002: 83).
After this “brief, more militant period” in the early 1970s, “the gay rights movement initiated an
important tactical shift: It began concentrating less on direct action and more on the struggle for
access to the same polity gay rights opponents had dominated for so long” (Werum and Winders
2001: 386).
In the decades that followed, a number of pivotal moments shaped the gay-rights
movement. These include the creation of notable gay rights groups (such as the Lambda Legal
Defense Fund in 1973), which, as Kollman and Badgett argue, is an important factor in the
attainment of SSU policies. But the historical literature also points to number of events that
brought the plight of gays and lesbians into the mainstream consciousness, including: the
American Psychiatric Association’s decision to depathologize homosexuality in 1973 and 1974,
the 1990 Federal Anti-Hate Crime Statistics Act — a “largely symbolic” law that “may have
accomplished an important goal by delegitimizing anti-gay bias and legitimizing homosexuals as
a minority group” — the murder of Matthew Shepherd, the AIDS crisis, and the revelation that
basketball star Magic Johnson was HIV-positive (see Werum and Winders 2001: 386-397;
Brewer 2003; Pollock 1994; Shilts 1987).
It is worth noting, as Hetherington and Weiler do, that, “Only when AIDS became
something more than a gay rights issue did public support for AIDS research increase
dramatically” (2009: 86). However, the AIDS movement assuredly rallied the LGBT political
movement, as they were now, in a very real way, fighting for their very lives. In 1979, a gay19

rights march on Washington, D.C. drew about 100,000 people; eight years later, in the heat of the
AIDS crisis, the same march drew more than a half-million (D’Emilio 2002: 86).
The trajectory of the gay-rights movement contrasts with other civil-rights movements,
such as the feminist movement, which was stymied in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the rise
of the antiabortion movement and the ultimate defeat of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
to the US Constitution. “By contrast,” writes historian John D’Emilio, “the gay and lesbian
movement has over the past thirty years grown in size, extended its influence, and expanded its
list of achievements. This has not happened at a steady pace; there have been reversals and
setbacks along the way” (2002: 39).
In the late 1970s, for instance, the movement’s successes, such as the election of the
country’s first openly gay public official, San Francisco Supervisor Harvey Milk, were often
counteracted by successful conservative opposition, such as the Anita Bryant-led campaign to
repeal an antidiscrimination law in Miami-Dade County (D’Emilio 2002: 84; also, Fetner 2001).
“But, overall, it is remarkable that, in the midst of a deepening conservative impulse in
American political life, this movement for social justice has marched forward” (D’Emilio 2002:
39).
Since Stonewall, D’Emilio points out (in a work published before the US Supreme
Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas), “a majority of American states have repealed sodomy
laws that were as old as the nation” (2002: 39).
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The new plateau of popular acceptance
Not surprisingly, gay men and lesbians’ improved legal standing coincided with more
favorable public attitudes toward homosexuals as a cohort. “Public attitudes about homosexuality
changed dramatically over the course of the 1990s,” writes Paul Brewer. Between 1973 and
1988, the proportion of respondents in the General Social Survey who believed that homosexual
sex was “always wrong” stayed about the same. “From 1992 onward, however, such hostility
(toward gays and lesbians) decreased rapidly … . In 1992, 71 percent of the GSS respondents
chose the ‘always wrong’ option; in 1994, 63 percent did; by 1998, only 54 percent did” (Brewer
2003: 1208). During the same time period, support for allowing gays and lesbians to serve in the
military increased as well.
These across-the-board pro-gay shifts “took place among men and among women,”
writes Brewer. “They took place among those with a college degree and among those without
one. They took place among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. They took place among
those who rejected literal interpretation of the Bible and among those who endorsed it; they took
place among those who rejected the label ‘born again’ and among those who embraced it” (2003:
1213).
Morris Fiorina, Samuel Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope (2005) chart the same trend. For
instance, they cite ANES “thermometer ratings” toward homosexuals from 1984 to 2004. Over
this 20-year period, the average rating has climbed from about 30 to slightly less than 50, on the
ANES scale from 0 to 100. During that same period, the percentage of respondents who rated
homosexuals a 0 declined markedly, from the mid-20s to roughly 10 percent in 2000 (2005: 113).
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While this increasing affect is evident across demographic groups, it is particularly so among
those under 50 years of age (Fiorina et. al. 2005: 124).
This viewpoint evolution was reflected in popular culture, in the coming-out of Ellen
DeGeneres, and in the television show Will & Grace, which featured a gay male lead character.
Brewer argues that the shift in mass opinions toward homosexuals in the 1990s can be traced to
increased information about and broader awareness of gays and lesbians (2003: 1217).
“Especially in the realm of popular culture, a new plateau has been reached,” D’Emilio
writes. “Particularly on television, but in Hollywood as well, gays and lesbians were becoming a
standard fixture. No longer framed as monsters, nor relegated to an occasional walk-on role, they
were increasingly a regular part of the social landscape” (2002: 88).
This “new plateau” of popular acceptance fits well with Hetherington and Weiler’s
concept of authoritarianism as a primary driver in debates over social issues. In this case, as gays
and lesbians became perceived as more mainstream, they become less threatening to those who
score at lower or median levels of authoritarianism. As the perception of threat diminishes, these
individuals become more receptive to both homosexuals as a group, and to pro-gay policies, as
the importance placed on personal pursuits of happiness supplant the import of maintaining the
social order.
However, although increasing affect toward gays and lesbians occurred over the last halfcentury throughout demographic and regional groups, the US’s federal system, with its
hodgepodge of local, state, and national laws, has produced disparate results for LGBT rights
activists. In the simplest terms, some parts of the US were clearly more sympathetic to the gay22

rights movement than others.
Werum and Winders’ compelling analysis of the gay-rights supporters’ and opponents’
successes between 1974 and 1999 shows that, of the 377 successful movements during that time
frame, the overwhelming majority (309-68) were initiated by gay-rights supporters (2001: 395).
Within this study, there are data that point to the role methods and institutions play: Anti-gay
rights activists, for instance, saw the bulk of their success at the ballot box — 35 percent of their
successful initiatives during this time period came from referenda. In contrast, pro-gay rights
advocates leaned on local governments for 65 percent of their successful initiatives, as well as
states legislatures and state courts.
“Consequently,” Werum and Winders write, “though both movements were most
effective on governmental levels, supporters seem more tied to the central arenas of the state
(legislature), while opponents rely primarily on a marginal channel requiring popular support
(ballot)” (2001: 398). This has created an interesting turn of events, they continue: “If anything,
gay rights opponents, rather than proponents, seem to have lost much of their earlier control over
legislative and judiciary channels — the two key institutions through which homosexuality used
to be marginalized and even criminalized” (2001: 402).

Individualization and the liberalization of gay rights policy
The liberalization of gay rights policies in the last half-century occurred worldwide. As
David John Frank and Elizabeth H. Mceneaney’s (1999) research demonstrates, between 1984
and 1995, 24 countries of the 86 in their study altered their policies towards homosexuality, and
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“nearly every change” was towards liberalization. The literature that follows explores this
change; if one presumes that same-sex marriage marks a pinnacle of the gay-rights movement’s
progress over the last half-century, these analyses, which center on the theoretical notion of the
rise of the individual over traditional family structures, will be of much assistance in developing
hypotheses.
In separate articles, Rhoda Howard-Hassman (2001) and Frank and Mceneaney (1999)
present a greater societal emphasis on individuality in Western culture as a causal factor.
Howard-Hassman (2001: 83) adds the devaluation of the influence of religion on moral norms:
“Only the development of a liberal society increasingly tolerant of personal privacy, including
sexual privacy, permits homosexuals to assert claims to social respect. Such liberalism also
coincides with small-s secularism: not necessarily the renunciation of religious views, but a
reconsideration of religious views in accordance with prevailing secular social norms ... .”
Frank and Mceneaney argue that the “effects of individualism can be observed … in the
depiction of same-sex sexuality as a ’human right,’ which as a matter of natural law accrues to all
individual persons” (1999: 916-917). Their data link gender equality to more liberal policies
towards homosexuals, which both being the fruit of the individualization tree. As they write,
“Sex has ceased to be dominantly associated with the family and procreation and has come to be
associated with the individual and pleasure. One expression of this shift is the recent rise and
public legitimation of same-sex relations.” In non-individualized societies, they continue, “sex is
typically bound to the heterosexual family and defined in terms of reproduction” (1999: 916).
Also, importantly, “competing explanations for the changes, such as economic development and
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democratization, receive little support” (1999: 911).
Peter M. Nardi associates the globalization of the gay-rights movement with the theme of
individualization. Citing D’Emilio, he notes that “only when wage labor became the primary
means of making a living — rather than through an interdependent family unit — was it possible
for homosexual desire to become the basis for personal identity and not just a behavioral pattern”
(1998: 570). He references Neil Miller’s preconditions for the emergence of a modern gay
identity, including a relatively higher social status for women and a level of economic
development that allows for independence and social mobility. In that vein, Kenneth D. Wald,
James A. Button and Barbara A. Rienzo argue, “Consistent with the urbanism theory, population
size is the single largest factor differentiating the two types of communities” — those with and
without anti-discrimination policies (1996: 1152). As their analysis shows, by the early 1990s 75
percent of all American cities with anti-discrimination ordinances had populations of 1 million or
more. Most of the rest had populations of at least 250,00014.
David Bradley reaches a similar conclusion in his comparative analysis of sexual
morality regulation in Finland and Sweden. “Sexual attitudes and behavior started to be liberated
in the 1970s with the accelerating social and economic developments in the society which
brought increasing numbers out of the agrarian society with its rigid social controls” (1999: 180).
Here again, urbanization is key.
Gregory B. Herek’s (1988: 452) research shows that heterosexuals who hold more

14 Interestingly, gay lifestyles have long been associated with urban environments. As Joseph Harry wrote in 1974,
“Such diversity of gay life-styles appears to induce a substantial volume of migration by gays to the larger cities,
much as the bright lights of the big city seem to appeal to single heterosexuals. It is suggested that gay and
heterosexual life-styles are similar in many ways and will become increasingly so in the future” (1974: 238).
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negative views toward homosexuals are: “1.) more likely to express traditional, restrictive
attitudes about gender-roles; 2.) more likely to manifest high levels of authoritarianism and
related personality characteristics; 3.) more likely to perceive their peers as manifesting negative
attitudes; 4.) less likely to have had personal contact with gay men or lesbians; and 5.) more
likely to subscribe to a conservative religious ideology.”
Herek assesses religiosity through three measures: frequency of religious service
attendance; placement on the orthodoxy subscale of the Religious Ideology Scale; and the
conservatism of the respondent’s denomination (1988: 456).
Similarly, Vyacheslav Karpov (2002: 267) emphasizes the role of ideology in religiosity
in his study of tolerance in the US and Poland. “Both in the United States and Poland,
intolerance appears to be linked primarily to theocratic beliefs, that is, to a political correlate of
religiosity rather than to its essential components, such as religious commitment and
participation that have weak direct effects only on the tolerance of atheists, and weak indirect
effects on other dimensions of tolerance.” Karpov emphasizes the political influence of a
country’s religious traditions, rather than the frequency with which a country’s residents attend
religious services, as a determining variable in analyzing.
In a similar vein, Hetherington and Weiler argue that, “Christian fundamentalists are
more intimately tied to their views of controversial political issues than are other religious
groups, such as Catholics and Jews” (2009: 88).
Donald P. Haider-Markel and Mark R. Joslyn argue that in the US, “Opposition to legal
recognition of same-sex marriage is a function of being non-white, male, older, politically
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conservative, less educated, and more religious” (2005: 236). Again, it is not just religiosity that
hinders the liberalization of policies towards gays and lesbians, but the combination of religiosity
and conservatism, as well as greater affect toward authoritarianism.

Case studies: Belgium, the UK, and Italy
Before delving into a discussion of my hypotheses, it is beneficial to look at the
experience in Western Europe to see if the themes delineated in the literature above hold up upon
scrutiny of survey and demographic data (see Appendix A for data), and to assist in the
development of independent variables that can be then transferred to my analysis of policy
divergence in the US, and tested through more sophisticated statistical measures. To this end, I
have constructed a brief most-similar case study of three Western European nations: Belgium,
which permits same-sex couples to marry; the UK, which permits same-sex couples to form civil
partnerships; and Italy, which affords gay and lesbian couples no legal recognition.
Broadly, we would expect Italy to be the most religious (and religiously conservative) of
the three countries; indeed, using data from the World Values Survey (2009) and other sources,
we find that Italy has the highest percentage of frequent churchgoers; in fact, it doubles the UK’s
amount and more than triples Belgium’s. Italians are also the most likely of the three countries to
volunteer for a religious organization — albeit by a slim margin — pray more often, consider
religion more important to their lives and have a significantly greater belief in sin and life after
death than do the Belgium and UK populations. Italians also profess a significantly greater
confidence in their religious institutions than do either the British or Belgians. On the other hand,
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more Italians believe that the church should not interfere in state business than do British.
Perhaps most surprising, given that Italians overwhelmingly disapprove of gay marriage and the
British population is relatively split on the issue (Angus Reid Global Monitor 2006), the data
show that Italians are no more prone to intolerance against homosexuals than are the British.
On the other hand, more Belgians pray, express confidence in their church and consider
religion important in their lives than do Britons. In fact, the perhaps intuitive difference one
might expect between the country with a marriage SSU policy and the country with a registration
SSU policy in many cases does not appear to exist. This would seem to cast doubt on the idea
that registered partnerships are a “lesser” form of marriage that would correlate with greater
religiosity, and would seem to support Kollman’s conclusion that greater religiosity leads
countries with SSU policies to select marriage over other arrangements because the symbolism
of marriage has greater saliency (2007: 354).
In this case study, urbanization does hold up as a factor. Of the three countries, Belgium
is the most urbanized. Italy is the least. Belgium is also the best educated of the three, and again,
Italy has the lowest proportion of citizens without tertiary educations.
Notably, Belgium also has the greatest proportion of women in its national legislature —
a means of measuring gender equality — and Belgians are more sympathetic toward single
mothers than in the other two countries. This is an indication that traditional gender roles may
not be as strong there as in the UK and Italy, which the literature suggests should correlate with a
greater propensity toward legal recognition of same-sex unions. A greater percentage of Italians
favor traditional, two-parent family models and express faith in the institution of marriage than
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in the other two countries; Italy also has the lowest divorce and non-marital birth rates of the
three. Belgians, for instance, voice significantly greater support for the two-parent family than do
Britons. The UK also has a much higher out-of-wedlock birthrate than does Belgium. Those two
data points seem to contradict that notion that there is a linear link between support for the
traditional family and same-sex marriage — although here again, these data would align nicely
with Kollman’s (2007: 354) analysis on the importance of marriage and a country’s decision to
select marriage over registered partnerships for same-sex couples. Then again, Belgium has a
higher divorce rate and a greater number of Belgians consider marriage outdated, so the picture
gleamed from this case study appears, in this regard, murky.
Generally speaking, however, these case studies perform as the literature would predict.

Theory and hypotheses
The literature presents a strong link between authoritarianism (and its corollaries,
including religious conservatism) and anti-gay feelings. But clearly, authoritarianism is not static.
The data presented in this review, as compiled by Fiorina et. al. (2005) and others, show that
affect toward homosexuals has risen steadily in recent decades. Hetherington and Weiler (2009)
demonstrate that this increased affect has crossed all levels of authoritarianism — and that
similar changes have been seen in the issue of black civil rights over the past generation.
Under the framework of authoritarianism, one then concludes that the explanation for this
change is that these once-marginal groups have become less threatening. As the groups become
perceived as less threatening to the social order, they become more acceptable, which in turn
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leads to more favorable policies; Lax and Phillips’ (2009) work shows congruence between
public opinion and policy choices in the states in gay-rights issues. In this regard, the key is
explaining the diminution of the perceived threat.
The other overarching peg to my theoretical framework is the notion of the supremacy of
individual happiness, as drawn from the literature on the liberalization of gay-rights policy in the
US and Western Europe (Frank and Mceneaney 1999; also, Howard-Hassman 2001). From this
perspective, we expect to find in survey and demographic data decreased support for traditional,
agrarian, patriarchal family structures among states and individuals that have the greatest affect
for homosexuals, and which favor more liberal SSU policies.
The following hypotheses, which will be tested with both individual- and state-level data
in the chapters that follow, are rooted in the abovementioned theoretical rubrics:

Hypothesis 1: Liberalism
Hypothesis 1a: In comparing individuals, those who have higher affect toward
homosexuals are more likely to favor liberal policies regarding same-sex marriage, gays in the
military, and gay and lesbian employment discrimination than those with a lower affect toward
homosexuals.
Hypothesis 1b: In comparing individuals, those who identify themselves as liberal are
more likely to favor liberal policies toward gay rights and gay marriage than those who identify
themselves as conservatives.
Hypothesis 1c: In comparing states, those whose electoral votes went to Barack Obama in
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the 2008 presidential election will be more likely to adopt liberal policies on same-sex marriage
and civil unions than those whose electoral votes went to John McCain.
Hypothesis 1d: In comparing states, those with higher levels of state spending will have
greater support for gay marriage and liberal gay rights policies than those with lower spending
levels.
Discussion: Here, I seek to test our most basic and intuitive assumptions — that liberals
will favor more liberal positions, and that conservatives will favor more conservative positions.
Moreover, I also wish to establish here that those who favor more liberal policies toward gay
civil rights will also be more likely to favor liberal SSU policies. Within states, I expect to find
that those demonstrating characteristics of liberalism, such as increased state government
spending and support for Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama, will be more apt to
support liberal SSU and gay rights policies, as well.

Hypothesis 2: Demographics: Age, education & urbanization
Hypothesis 2a: In comparing individuals, those who are elderly will be less likely to
support liberal SSU and gay rights policies than those who are not elderly.
Hypothesis 2b: In comparing states, those with larger percentages of elderly persons will
be less likely to adopt liberal SSU policies than those with smaller percentages of elderly
populations.
Hypothesis 2c: In comparing individuals, those who have attained higher levels of
education are more likely to support more liberal gay civil rights and SSU policies than those
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who have not.
Hypothesis 2d: In comparing individuals, those who performed poorly on tests that
measure scientific and vocabulary knowledge will be less likely to support liberal SSU and gay
rights policies than those who performed well.
Hypothesis 2e: In comparing states, those with greater percentages of their populations
that have received tertiary educations will be more likely to have liberal gay civil rights and SSU
policies than those with lesser percentages with tertiary educations.
Hypothesis 2f: In comparing states, those with higher levels of urbanization will be more
likely to enact liberal SSU policies than those that are less urban.
Hypothesis 2g: In comparing individuals, those who reside in more urban environments
will be more likely to support SSU policies than those who reside in more rural environments.
Discussion: Here, I will test an assumption not well covered in the above literature —
that is, the idea that older Americans adhere to traditional mores and tend to be more adverse to
liberal gay-rights than younger Americans. This assumption is supported by published polling
data: For instance, a Gallup poll released in May 2009 found that, though among all Americans a
majority (57 percent) opposed same-sex marriage, among those 18-29 years of age, a strong
majority (59 percent) supported same-sex unions (Jones 2009). Also, Hetherington and Weiler
(2009) link education to declining levels of authoritarianism, which in turn, they link to greater
support for gay rights. Hence, my hypotheses predict that as education goes up, so do does affect
toward homosexuals and support for liberal SSU and gay rights policies. Also, based on the
research of Wald et. al. (1996), as well as the well-established linkage between urban
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environments and gay culture (Harry 1974), these hypotheses predict a relationship between
urbanization — and the accompanying social mobility it affords — and a heightened sense of the
importance of the individual, which, in turn, should produce stronger support for liberal SSU
policies.

Hypothesis 3: Religiosity
Hypothesis 3a: In comparing states, those with lower levels of religiosity (as measured by
the percentage of individuals who attend religious services frequently) will be more likely to
have liberal SSU policies than those with higher levels of religiosity.
Hypothesis 3b: In comparing states, those with lower proportions of evangelicals will
have more liberal SSU and gay rights policies than states with higher proportions of religious
evangelicals.
Hypothesis 3c: In comparing individuals, those who less frequently attend religious
services will be more likely to support liberal SSU policies, than those who more frequently
attend religious services.
Hypothesis 3d: In comparing individuals, those who adhere to tenets associated with
fundamentalist Christianity — a belief in a literal interpretation of the Bible, for instance — will
tend to have a lower affect for homosexuals and support more conservative positions with regard
to same-sex marriage and gay rights than those who do not.
Hypothesis 3e: In comparing individuals, those who profess confidence in religious
organizations will be more involved in public policy will be more likely to oppose liberal SSU
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policies than those that do not.
Discussion: Throughout the literature, the link between religiosity (particularly
conservative religiosity) and support for anti-gay policies is among the most robust, and perhaps
the most intuitive. One could not expect, after all, persons who believe that homosexual conduct
is a sin to embrace policies allowing same-sex couples to wed, with the blessing of the state and
the legal ramifications such policies entail. Also, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) ably
demonstrate, there is a strong correlation between evangelical Protestantism and high
authoritarianism scores, and between authoritarianism and anti-gay policies. Hence, we would
expect to find in individual-level data a strong correlation between such religiosity — i.e. support
for literal interpretations of the Bible and traditional vales —and both more anti-gay
thermometer readings (in the ANES) and low support for liberalized policies on gay marriage,
gays in the military, and gay and lesbian employment discrimination protections.

Hypothesis 4: Authoritarianism & tolerance
Hypothesis 4a: In comparing individuals, those who stake out hawkish positions in
matters of foreign policy and national defense — supporting the war in Iraq, increases in defense
spending, or the torture of suspected terrorists — will be more likely to oppose liberal policies
regarding gay civil rights, and will be more likely to have lower affect toward gays and lesbians
than those who take more dovish positions on foreign policy issues.
Hypothesis 4b: In comparing individuals, those who have a lower affect toward feminists,
African Americans, Hispanics, and other groups will also have a lower affect toward
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homosexuals, and will be more likely to take positions opposing gay civil rights and gay
marriage than those with a higher affect toward these groups.
Hypothesis 4c: In comparing individuals, those who voice place greater emphasis on the
maintenance of social order, as opposed to civil rights, will be more likely to oppose liberal SSU
and gay rights policies.
Discussion: Here, I will test some of the links presented in Hetherington and Weiler’s
important work on authoritarianism. Hetherington and Weiler identify in their work a link
between an acclimation toward authoritarianism and support for the maintenance of the existing
social order and opposition to gay civil rights. It is important to note here that I do not mean to
simply re-do their work, which largely draws from the same data source, the ANES. Instead, I
will analyze the effect of variables associated with authoritarianism, and their impact on gay
rights and gay marriage opinion, in an attempt to offer a wider look at authoritarianism’s
relationship to respondents’ opinions.

Hypothesis 5: Moral traditionalism
Hypothesis 5a: In comparing states, those with higher rates of divorce, nonmarital
childbirth, and nonmarital different-sex cohabitation are more likely to have liberal SSU and gay
civil rights policies than those with lower rates of divorce.
Hypothesis 5b: In comparing states, those with a higher percentage of women in the state
legislature are more likely to favor liberal gay civil rights and SSU policies than those with a
lower percentage of women legislators.
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Hypothesis 5c: In comparing individuals, those who voice support for the traditional,
nuclear family — in which the father is the head of household and breadwinner, and the mother
stays home with the children — and traditional norms will be less likely to support liberal gay
civil rights and SSU policies, and to have a lower affect for homosexuals, than those who do not
have such views.
Discussion: Throughout the literature, we see a decline in emphasis on traditional family
structure correlate with an increase in support for gay civil rights. This is, in a sense, the triumph
of the individual; an individual’s right to pursue his or her own happiness becomes paramount in
these postmaterialist cultures. Societies become less patriarchal, less rural, and more inclined to
see gay and lesbian behavior and relationships not as a threat to the established way of life, but
as another means by which an individual can seek pleasure. Based on the literature and on the
European case study examples, these hypotheses predict that a society in which women are seen
as societal equals, and have access to the halls of power (in this case, the legislature), will also be
more accepting of gay and lesbian relationships.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
The hypotheses discussed in the preceding chapter can be broadly divided into two categories:
those designed to test how individuals’ positions on SSU and gay-rights policies are related to
their levels of religiosity, tolerance, authoritarianism, liberalism, education, and so forth; and,
secondly, those designed to test these relationships between these variables and both public
opinion and policy choices on a statewide level.
As Lax and Phillips point out (2009), states’ policy choices in matters related to gay civil
rights tend to correlate to public opinion, regardless of how those policy choices were enacted
(legislatively, judicially, or by executive order). Importantly for my research, Lax and Phillips
have developed state-by-state public opinion estimates on a number of gay-rights issues using a
method called multilevel regression and postratification (MRP), which they argue is a superior
method to disaggregating opinion surveys. I will discuss MRP in more detail later in this chapter.
In the chapter that follows, my hypotheses will be tested using both individual- and statelevel data. The individual-level data will be culled largely from the 2008 American National
Election Study and General Social Survey (hereafter, ANES and GSS, respectively), although
some time-series data will be utilized as well. The state level data will be drawn from a variety of
sources: State opinion data will be taken from the MRP estimates developed by Lax and Phillips;
religiosity data are taken from Gallup (Newport 2006), and Badgett (2009: 196-197)15. Badgett
also uses state-level percentages of tolerance for same-sex sexual behavior and heterosexual nonmarital cohabitations, using data from the US Census Bureau (2009: 195-197). The US Census
15 Badgett’s data are taken from the 2000 Religious Congregations and Membership survey of religious
organizations, as conducted by the Association of Statisticians of Religious Bodies.
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Bureau offers state-level data on tertiary education and population density, which I shall use to
test urbanization hypotheses. The National Conference of State Legislatures tracks the
percentage of women in each state legislature. CNN (2008) has the results of the 2008 US
presidential election. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for
Health Statistics tracks marriage and divorce rates. Data on state gay rights policies come from
Lambda Legal (2009) and media sources.
It is important to note that although this research is focused primarily on SSU policy
development, these policies do not happen in a vacuum. To understand these policy choices in
their proper context, we must understand that these policies are part and parcel of a more general
liberalization of both law and cultural affect toward homosexuals in recent decades. Society,
even among its more conservative elements, has become unquestionably more gay-friendly in
recent decades, both in affect and policies: For instance, we see in ANES time-series data that,
over a 20-year period, from 1984 to 2004, study respondents’ opinion of homosexuals — as
measured by asking respondents to rate their affect toward this cohort on a 1-100 scale called a
thermometer — increased steadily, if not in a completely linear manner, from 43.2 in 1984 to
55.4 in 2004.
These data are supported by recent public polling data, which indicate that, for the first
time, a majority of Americans — albeit bare: 50 percent to 48 percent — do not believe that
homosexuality is a moral issue; a generation ago, in 1978, 53 percent of Americans believed that
homosexuality was morally wrong, to only 38 percent who believed it was not a moral issue
(McMorris-Santoro 2010).
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Questions of SSU policy cannot be divested from questions of gay rights and popular
affect toward homosexuals. After all, it is only with the rise in the percentages of those who do
not see homosexuality as a moral issue that gay marriage has become ripe for consideration.
These issues are, put simply, intertwined. For that reason, I will test independent variables for
more than just their relationship with marriage policy, but with other gay rights issues as well.
My methods are fairly standard for social science research: Depending on the nature of
the variables being tested, I will use cross-tabulation, mean comparison, ordinary least squares,
logistic regression or multinomial logistic regression analyses; these are all, of course, standard
arrows in the researcher’s quiver. However, taken together, these tests can demonstrate not only
the statistical significance of these relationships, but also allow us to infer how these
relationships work, and how robust they are.
But developing these tests presents the challenge: Some of the concepts this research will
test need to be defined: For instance, when we talk about religiosity, as almost all of the literature
does, to what are we referring? Much of the research focuses on the frequency of church
attendance as the key measure of religiosity, but this definition is not universal. Badgett (2009)
also looks to the number of evangelicals in each state as a potential factor in the evolution of
state policy. Both Karpov (2002) and Hetherington and Weiler (2009) point toward more
conservative, fundamentalist strains of religion as central to the relationship between an
individual and his or her opinion on SSU policies.
My goal is not to settle on one definition, but to analyze all of them. Thus, in the chapter
that follows, I will test religious service attendance, but also measures of fundamentalism and
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conservatism religious practice, as well as measures designed to test how deeply one applies
their religious beliefs to their personal life (for example, how often one prays). Similarly, to
better evaluate the relationship between education and attitudes toward gay rights policy, I will
look at not only the level of education one has received, but also how well one responded to the
battery of vocabulary and scientific knowledge questions posed in the GSS.
Ultimately, my goal is to test these concepts and variables as robustly as possible, so as to
obtain as comprehensive an understanding of the issue as possible, despite its complexities.
These tests, of course, have their limitations. Not the least of which is the fact that, in dealing
with conceptualizations of such things as individualization, liberalism, authoritarianism, and
religiosity, there is the chance that the tests I undertake in the following chapter will not fully
flesh out all of the complexities of these sociological issues. As Hetherington and Weiler (2009:
35) note, science does not know whether to attribute an inclination toward authoritarianism to
nurture or nature, or some combination thereof. There are similar problems associated with such
concepts as the individualization of society, as well as the abovementioned definitional issues
associated with religiosity. That said, by testing a wide swath of variables, I hope to overcome as
many of these imprecisions as possible within the scope of this research.
In that sense, this research design should enable us to test in a more well-rounded way the
many aspects of SSU and gay rights policy in the US, both from individual opinion-forming and
state-level policy-making perspectives. And in this sense, I believe such a study will add to the
growing body of literature on this subject. None of the research reviewed in Chapter 2 has
endeavored to tackle these issues in such a comprehensive way, with the exception, perhaps, of
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Badgett (2009). Her book, however, relied heavily upon qualitative research and focused more
heavily on the European experience, although her chapters on the US were indeed valuable.
Finally, I would like to briefly discuss Lax and Phillips’ use of MRP, and elaborate on my
decision to employ their opinion estimates. In their study on state responsiveness to public
opinion — a study for which an accurate measurement of state-by-state public opinion is
inherently necessary — they opted to use MRP primarily because of the shortcomings of its
primary competitor, disaggregation: “Disaggregation involves combining a large set of national
polls and then calculating the opinion percentages disaggregated by state,” they write (2009:
371). “The principle disadvantage is that a large number of national surveys are required, usually
over a very long time period ... to create a sufficient sample size within each state. Even then,
smaller states or those seldom surveyed must sometimes be dropped entirely.”
This point is not inconsequential to my research, as several of the states (and Washington,
D.C.) with a more liberal SSU policy — Vermont, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, specifically
—are quite small. As Lax and Phillips write, “Indeed, we cannot use this approach
[disaggregation] here: most of the gay rights issues are too rarely polled, and opinion on these
issues is not sufficiently stable for disaggregation over long periods of time” (2009: 371).
Lax and Phillips tout MRP as a superior substitute. As they describe it, MRP estimates a
multilevel model of survey responses, “with opinion modeled as a function of demographic and
geographic predictors: individual responses are modeled as nested within states nested within
regions, and are also nested within demographic grouping” (2009: 371). In the second step,
poststratification, “the estimates for each demographic-geographic respondent type are weighted
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(poststratified) by the percentages of each type in actual state populations, so that we can
estimate the percentage of respondents within each state who have a particular issue position”
(2009: 371).
This definition raises concerns: Namely, Lax and Phillips are dealing with what they
believe respondent opinion should be, in their estimation, rather than what it actually is. Indeed,
their state-by-state breakdown of opinions on gay rights issues is not based on actual human
beings answering questions, but rather, a model, an estimation, of what their responses would be.
However, Lax and Phillips argue that “MRP consistently outperforms disaggregation” in
comparisons with actual state polls (2009: 371).
While there is some polling data available on state-by-state opinions of gay marriage,
consistent, reliable data on civil unions and other gay-rights related issues, such as employment
protections, are harder to come by. Thus, I have elected to use Lax and Phillips’ MRP estimates
of opinions as a basis for some of the quantitative tests that follow. (See Appendix B for
estimates.)
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
In this chapter, I present the results of the quantitative tests of the hypotheses detailed in Chapter
2. To simplify my presentation, these results will be organized via the same five subject
groupings as before: liberalism, demographics, religiosity, authoritarianism and tolerance, and
moral traditionalism. The following chapter will offer a more detailed discussion of these results.

Hypothesis 1: Liberalism
My expectations for this series of tests are relatively straightforward: Given the literature,
one expects to find a relationship between liberalism and liberal SSU and gay-rights policies.
The data do not disappoint.

Hypothesis 1a: In comparing individuals, those who have higher affect toward homosexuals are
more likely to favor liberal policies regarding same-sex marriage, gays in the military, and gay
and lesbian employment discrimination than those with a lower affect toward homosexuals.
Below, I present the results of analyses that use as their dependent variable an additive
index created from respondents’ positions on SSU policy, gay adoption, gays in the military, and
gay and lesbian discrimination protection, and an independent variable formed from quantiles of
the respondents’ placement of homosexuals on the ANES’ 1-100 “thermometer,” in which “1”
equals the lowest possible rating, and “100” equals the highest. Within the gay rights index, the
four policy positions have been combined into an additive index of gay rights: Respondents were
scored “1” for each answer in favor of the more liberal position on gay rights in each of the four
categories, except for gay marriage, in which those who favored civil unions were coded as “1”
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and those who favored the more liberal position, marriage rights, were coded as “2.” In all cases,
those answering in the opposition were coded “0.” Thus, the highest possible score would be a
“5,” in the case of an individual who favored the most liberal positions on gay marriage, gay
adoption, gays in the military, and gay discrimination protection. These data were then grouped
into a three-category variable: high, moderate, and low16. For the categorical analyses involving
the “gay thermometer,” respondents’ answers have been coded into four quantiles, from lowest to
highest affect toward gays and lesbians.

Table 1. Gay rights support by affect toward homosexuals

Gay rights
support

Low
affect

Moderately low
affect

Moderately high
affect

High
affect

Totals

Low support

41

21

7

4

20

Moderate
support

36

38

28

14

32

High support

24

42

65

82

48

Totals

100

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded

The data shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 demonstrate the intuitive relationship between
affect and gay rights support. Those who have “warmer” feelings — to borrow the ANES’
vernacular — toward homosexuals are, unsurprisingly, more willing to bestow upon them

16 As with all of the ensuing tests derived from ANES data, the data have been weighted to account for
oversampling.
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expanded civil rights protections. Among those in the highest category of affect toward gays and
lesbians, 82 percent fall into the highest grouping of gay rights support. Among those in the
lowest value of affect, only 24 percent are classified as having high support for gay civil rights
policies. (We do not see notable differences when the population sample is narrowed to only
white respondents.) Moreover, those who have greater affect toward homosexuals are also more
likely to favor relationship recognition policies, as shown in Table 2. Among those with high
affect, 72 percent support gay marriage. Among those in the lowest affect category, 57 percent
believe that society should not recognize same-sex unions.
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Figure 1. Gay rights support by affect toward homosexuals

Table 2. Gay marriage and affect toward homosexuals
Gay marriage
position

Low
affect

Moderately Moderately
low affect
high affect

High
affect

Totals

Support gay
marriage

24

32

49

72

39

Support civil unions

19

30

33

16

26

Oppose SSU
recognition

57

38

19

12

35

Totals

100

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded.
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Notably — and, perhaps, predictably, if we view civil unions as the “compromise
position” between support for gay marriage and opposition to all relationship recognition —
support for civil unions (but not gay marriage) peaks among the two “moderate” affect
groupings.

Hypothesis 1b: In comparing individuals, those who identify themselves as liberal are more
likely to favor liberal policies regarding gay rights and gay marriage than those who identify
themselves as conservatives.
The data presented in Table 3 support the conclusion — again, a fairly intuitive one —
that liberals are more likely to stake out liberal gay rights and SSU recognitions positions than
conservatives. However, the results are not as stark as one might expect: roughly the same
percentage of self-identified conservatives and liberals fall into the “low support” cohort, and
while 59 percent of liberals take the most liberal positions on gay rights, so too do 45 percent of
conservatives. While liberals are indeed more likely to have high gay rights support,
conservatives are not more likely than the other ideological cohorts to have low gay rights
support.
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Table 3. Gay rights and ideology.
Gay rights support

Conservative

Moderate

Liberal

Totals

Low support

14

14

15

14

Moderate support

41

33

26

34

High support

45

53

59

51

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded

With gay marriage, ideology continues to play a role, but only among liberals. There is
very little differentiation between the positions of moderates and conservatives: 40 percent of
conservatives support gay marriage, as do 41 percent of moderates. An additional 26 percent of
both conservatives and moderates favor the compromise of civil unions. Among liberals,
meanwhile, 53 percent favor gay marriage, and another 24 percent favor affording gay couples
lesser legal recognition.
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Figure 2. Gay marriage support by ideology

To test the potential effect of race, I performed a cross-tabulation analysis, using only
white respondents as the sample. Those results, shown in Table 4, are somewhat similar to what
we get with the entire ANES sample.
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Table 4. Gay rights and ideology (whites only)
Gay rights support

Conservative

Moderate

Liberal

Totals

Low support

13

6

12

11

Moderate support

41

40

26

36

High support

47

54

62

53

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded. White respondents only
Hypothesis 1c: In comparing states, those whose electoral votes went to Barack Obama
in the 2008 presidential election will be more likely to adopt liberal policies on same-sex
marriage and civil unions than those whose electoral votes went to John McCain.
Given the connection between liberalism and liberal gay rights policies demonstrated
above, we would expect that, in states with liberal characteristics, there would be greater support
for liberal gay rights and gay marriage policies. The next two series of tests explore this
relationship on a statewide level: first, I tested the relationship between gay marriage opinion and
a state’s 2008 presidential vote. This test produces the expected result, as illustrated in Figure 3.
A linear regression analysis generates a coefficient of .76 and an adjusted R-square value of .64.
Similarly, when the dependent variable is a state’s mean gay rights opinion — the mean of the
MRP gay-rights opinion estimates created by Lax and Phillips (2009: 373) — we get a slightly
smaller, but still significant, coefficient of .44, and an adjusted R-square value of .48. In the
states that Obama won, 44.5 percent favor allowing gays to marriage; in states that McCain won,
only 32.5 percent do so. In Obama states, 54.5 percent favor allowing gay couples to form civil
unions; 42.6 percent favor this in McCain states.
Of course, this is not meant to suggest that a vote for Obama causes one to support gay
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marriage; rather, I argue that this relationship is rooted in liberalism.

Figure 3. Gay marriage support by 2008 election

Hypothesis 1d: In comparing states, those with higher levels of state spending will be have
greater support for gay marriage and liberal gay rights policies than those with lower spending
levels.
As with the previous test, we would expect that states with higher levels of spending —
denoting liberalism — would be more likely to support liberal gay rights and gay marriage
policies. However, regression analyses do not produce statistically significant results. Contra
51

Badgett (2009: 191), my tests do not support any relationship between state spending and
increased support for gay rights. Indeed, of the top five states in per-capita social spending (in
order: Alaska, Wyoming, Vermont, Delaware, and New York), only Vermont permits same-sex
marriage (Tax Foundation 2009).

Hypothesis 2: Demographics: Age, education & urbanization
Public polling data suggest that older Americans will have a lesser affinity toward gay
rights and will be less likely to support liberal SSU than other cohorts, perhaps because they
adhere to more traditional norms. The data presented from Europe in Chapter 2 indicate that
education and urbanization should have a positive effect on gay rights and gay marriage opinion
as well. The tests that follow probe these demographic relationships.

Hypothesis 2a: In comparing individuals, those who are elderly will be less likely to
support liberal SSU and gay rights policies than those who are not elderly.
My tests conform with the polling data cited in Chapter 2: As shown in Tables 4 and 5,
younger persons are considerably more likely to hold liberal views on gay rights issues. Among
those 18 to 30 years old, for instance, 66 percent fall into the highest gay rights cohort and 61
percent favor allowing gays to marry. Senior citizens, meanwhile, comprise the only age cohort
in which a majority (53 percent) disapproves of any same-sex relationships recognition.
Interestingly, support for civil unions remains relatively stable across the three oldest age
grouping, at between 27 and 31 percent. However, among those 18 to 30, this plummets to 18
percent. The data suggest that the youngest cohort has lower support for civil unions because
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more of them reject this compromise in favor of full marriage equality.

Table 5. Gay rights and age
Gay rights support

18 to 30

31 to 50

51 to 64

Over 65

Totals

Low support

11

18

23

34

20

Moderate support

23

32

37

38

32

High support

66

50

40

29

48

Totals

100

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded
Table 6. Gay marriage and age
Gay marriage position

18 to 30

31 to 50

51 to 64

Over 65

Totals

Support gay marriage

61

42

28

20

39

Support civil unions

18

27

31

28

26

Oppose SSU recognition

22

31

41

53

35

Totals

100

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded

Hypothesis 2b: In comparing states, those with larger percentages of elderly persons will
be less likely to adopt liberal SSU policies than those with smaller percentages of elderly
populations.
Given the relationship between gay rights opinion and age reported above, we would
expect to find a similarly strong relationship between opinions and age on a statewide level.
However, a regression analysis does not support this hypothesis: the percentage of a state's
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population that is over 65 does not produce a statistically significant link to that state’s support
for either gay marriage or gay rights. However, as later tests will demonstrate, the age variable
does succeed when other variables, such as education, are held constant. It appears that the
effects of age are obscured by other, hidden variables.

Hypothesis 2c: In comparing individuals, those who have attained higher levels of
education are more likely to support more liberal gay civil rights and SSU policies than those
who have not.
The data shown in Table 7 support the hypothesized relationship between education and
liberal gay civil rights opinion: 58 percent of those in the highest education cohort fall into the
highest category of support for gay rights, compared to just 34 percent in the in the lowest
education cohort17. The more highly educated are also more likely to support gay marriage, as
we see in Table 8. Removing non-white respondents from the sample does little to change the
effect of education on either gay rights or gay marriage support; that said, we do see a change in
opinion among college graduates, who are slightly more likely to have high gay rights support
(63 percent to 58 percent) and gay marriage support (49 percent to 45 percent) than those in the
wider sample.

Table 7. Gay rights and education
17 The ANES variable asks the “highest grade of school or year of college R completed.” The answers are
presented numerically; from these numbers, I extrapolated the data into these three categories.
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Gay rights
support

Some high
school

Graduated HS/
Some college

Graduated
college

Totals

Low support

26

21

13

20

Moderate support

40

31

30

32

High support

34

48

58

48

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded

Table 8. Gay marriage and education
Gay marriage
position

Some high
school

Graduated HS/
Some college

Graduated
College

Totals

Support gay
marriage

35

39

45

39

Support civil
unions

20

26

31

26

Oppose SSU
recognition

45

35

24

35

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded

Hypothesis 2d: In comparing individuals, those who performed poorly on tests that
measure scientific and vocabulary knowledge will be less likely to support liberal SSU and gay
rights policies than those who performed well.
To test this hypothesis, I employ two variables created from GSS data: One is an additive
index that measures scientific knowledge; the other is an additive index of a respondent’s
55

knowledge of vocabulary words. As with the prior indexes, these were divided into a three-value
variable, denoting “low,” “moderate,” and “high” levels of knowledge.
Per the hypothesis, among those with the highest levels of scientific knowledge, 68
percent favor permitting gays to marry (72 percent if non-whites are excluded from the analysis).
Among those in the lowest cohort of scientific knowledge, just 26 percent hold the same opinion
18. The results are more stark when the question is the morality of same-sex sexual relations19:
95 percent of those in the lowest scientific knowledge cohort believe that gay sex is wrong, while
just 35 percent of those in the high knowledge group do so.
We see similar results when employing vocabulary knowledge as the independent
variable: 85 percent of those with low vocabulary knowledge believe that gay sex is wrong, and
69 percent oppose gay marriage. In the highest vocabulary group, however, 50 percent believe
that gay sex is not morally wrong, and 54 percent approve of gay marriage. (It is peculiar,
perhaps, that slightly more people believe that gays and lesbians should be allowed to wed than
believe that homosexual sexual relations are not immoral. This would speak to a libertarian strain
of thought: that it is not the government’s role to legislate morality.)

18 It should be noted that the GSS questions from which I created this index included queries on evolution and the
Big Bang theory, which may have influenced some respondents’ answers, particularly if they believe in the literal
biblical interpretation of the Genesis story.
19 Although Chi-square test reveals a P-value of 0 for both analyses of scientific knowledge, it is worth noting that
these tests produces a relatively small number of respondents, 220 for gay marriage question and 232 for the gay
sex question, largely because high numbers of respondents failed to answer a science question, and were thus
removed from the index.
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Hypothesis 2e: In comparing states, those with greater percentages of their populations
that have received tertiary educations will be more likely to have liberal gay civil rights and SSU
policies than those with lesser percentages with tertiary educations.
Because education is linked to more liberal gay rights opinions, we would expect that
states with more educated individuals would also have higher support for gay civil rights and gay
marriage. And indeed, regression analyses show the predicted robust relationships: the
percentage of a state’s population with a tertiary education produces a coefficient of 1.3 when the
dependent variable is support for gay marriage (see Figure 4 below), and .73 when the dependent
variable is mean gay rights support. (These tests produce adjusted R-square values of .48 and
.29, respectively.)
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Figure 4. Gay marriage support by tertiary education

Importantly, the education variable succeeds when the over-65 age variable is held
constant. Interestingly, in this multivariate regression analysis, the age variable achieves
statistical significance with education held constant — something it did not do in my earlier
bivariate analysis. (Together, these independent variables produce an adjusted R-square value of
.52 when gay marriage support is the dependent variable). This would suggest that the effects of
age were obscured by education. Notably, however, the age coefficient is positive, which is
contrary to my earlier hypothesized expectations. In other words, assuming equal levels of
58

education, states with higher percentages of older individuals would be more likely to have
higher levels of support for gay marriage. This finding underscores the importance that education
plays in the liberalization of gay rights policies.
A logistic regression analysis indicates that the percentage of a state’s population with a
tertiary education impacts policy as well as opinion. Here, I employed a binary dependent
variable that separated state based upon whether they had extended legal relationship recognition
to gay couples, whether via marriage or some lesser form. The tertiary education variable
produces a coefficient of .39, which is significant at the .05 level, and pseudo R-square value of
.29. A multivariate logistic regression analysis shows that both the age and education variables
are significant with regard to SSU policy when the other is held constant: In this test, the
education variable produces a coefficient of .4, which is significant at the .05 level, and the age
variable produces a coefficient of .6, which is significant at the .10 level. (The pseudo R-square
value is .37.) Again, with education held constant, the percentage of seniors seems to have a
liberalizing effect on policy.

Hypothesis 2f: In comparing individuals, those who reside in more urban environments will be
more likely to support liberal SSU policies than those who reside in more rural environments.
The cross-tabulation data in Table 9 would seem to mostly support the hypothesis.
However, the difference between city-dwellers and suburbanites is relatively minute compared to
the difference between those who live in and around cities and those who live in rural
environments. It is this latter category that harbors the most opposition to gay marriage, while
opinion within the city and suburban groupings is not markedly different.
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However, when the sample is comprised only of whites, we see a distinction between
urban and suburban. Here, 57 percent of white urbanites support gay marriage, compared to 48
percent of white suburbanites. This is in keeping with Hetherington and Weiler’s research, which
argues that blacks are “the most authoritarian racial group in the United States by far,”
particularly among those in inner cities (2009: 141). Although they overwhelmingly vote
Democratic, African-Americans tend to hold more culturally conservative positions than do
white liberals.

Table 9. Gay marriage and urbanization
Gay marriage position

City

Suburb

Rural

Totals

Support gay marriage

51

47

27

45

Oppose gay marriage

49

53

73

55

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: GSS 2008. Values rounded

Hypothesis 2g: In comparing states, those with higher levels of urbanization will be more likely
to enact liberal SSU policies than those that are less urban.
If urbanites tend to hold more liberal positions regarding gay marriage, we would expect
that states with more urban populations would have higher levels of gay marriage support. A
bivariate regression analysis bears out this hypothesis. However, after controlling for age and
education, urbanization loses its statistical significance. The explanatory power of urbanization
appears to be confined to the fact that the young and better educated are draw to urban areas.
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Hypothesis 3: Religiosity
In the literature, perhaps not topic is as closely tied to opinions on gay rights and SSU
policy than religiosity. However, religiosity as a concept is fairly ambiguous, as the term can
describe several facets of religious faith: church attendance, fundamentalism, and the belief in
the joining of church and state, to name a few. Moreover, within the US, some religious
traditions are more closely linked to socially conservative ideology than are others; theoretically,
we might expect a devout attendee of a more liberal institution to hold more liberal views on gay
rights, while a devotee of a conservative church — the Southern Baptists, for instance — may
hold more conservative views. Thus, I argue that examining religiosity requires more than
reliance only upon church attendance data, but a broader battery of tests of the component parts
of the American religious experience.

Hypothesis 3a: In comparing states, those with lower levels of religiosity (as measured by the
percentage of individuals who attend religious services frequently) will be more likely to have
liberal SSU policies than those with higher levels of religiosity.
As predicted, states with more frequent religious service attendees have lower levels of
support for gay marriage. This bivariate regression analysis reveals a remarkably strong adjusted
R-square value of .82, suggesting that this variable contributes the most significant piece of the
explanatory pie. (This relationship is displayed in Figure 5.) The weekly church attendance
variable succeeds splendidly as well when the dependent variable is a state’s mean gay rights
support, as well. Also unsurprisingly, a logistic regression analysis confirms that church
attendance has an impactful and statistically significant effect on state policy, too, with a pseudo
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R-square value of .39.

Figure 5. Gay marriage support by church attendance

Table 10 reports the results of a multivariate regression analysis with gay marriage
support as the dependent variable and weekly religious service attendance, percentage of seniors,
and percentage with a tertiary education as the independent variables. After controlling for age
and education, church attendance produces the predicted negative coefficient. What is perhaps
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more interesting about this analysis is that, controlling for church attendance and education, age
again produces a positive coefficient, and controlling for church attendance and age, education
has a negative impact on gay marriage opinion.

Table 10: Gay marriage, church attendance, age, and education
Independent variables

Support for gay marriage

Constant

44.63

Weekly church attendance

-.7*

Over 65

.59**

Tertiary education

-.6*

Source: Lax and Phillips (2009: 373); Newport 2006; US Census Bureau.
* Values significant at the .05 level
** Values significant at the .10 level
Adjusted R-square = .88

Hypothesis 3b: In comparing states, those with lower proportions of evangelicals will have more
liberal SSU and gay rights policies than states with higher proportions of religious evangelicals.
While there is a strong correlation between the percentages of weekly churchgoers and
evangelicals within states, .74, this nonetheless falls below the .80 standard for multicollinearity,
and as such, evangelicalism warrants evaluation (Pollock 2009: 193).
In keeping with the arguments presented by Badgett (2009), regression analyses show
that the percentage of a state’s population who consider themselves evangelicals does, in fact,
have a relationship with that state’s opinion toward gay rights and gay marriage, even after
controlling for church attendance. A bivariate logistic regression analysis reveals that
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evangelicals have an effect on policy, as well as opinion: here, we see a regression coefficient of
-.29, and pseudo R-square value of .33. Table 11 reports a multivariate regression analysis that
shows that, although evangelicalism is statistically significant, its explanatory power is
overwhelmed by the test's other intervening variables. Given the high correlation between church
attendance and evangelicalism, this result is not unexpected. However, it is nonetheless
noteworthy that evangelicalism produces significant results above and beyond these other tested
variables.

Table 11. Gay marriage, church attendance, age, education, and evangelicalism
Independent variables

Gay marriage support

Constant

45.9

Weekly church attendance

-.59*

Over 65

.54**

Tertiary education

.49**

Evangelicalism

-.15**

Source: Lax and Phillips (2009: 373); Newport 2006; US Census Bureau; Badgett (2009: 196197).
* Values significant at the .05 level
** Values significant at the .10 level
Adjusted R-square = .89
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Hypothesis 3c: In comparing individuals, those who less frequently attend religious services will
be more likely to support liberal SSU policies than those who more frequently attend religious
services.
As we saw with states, individuals who attend church more often are more likely to
oppose gay civil rights and same-sex marriage policies (see Tables 12 and 13 for data). Of
those who attend services the most frequently, just 27 percent can be classified as having high
support for gay rights, compared to 50 percent of those who attend infrequently or never.
Meanwhile, among less frequent attendees, 17 percent fall into the lowest gay rights category,
compared to 34 percent among frequent churchgoers. We see the same relationship with gay
marriage opinion: among those in the lowest cohort of attendance, 69 percent favor some
form of SSU recognition, and 42 percent favor full marriage rights. Meanwhile, a majority (54
percent) of frequent attendees oppose any SSU recognition.
Running the same analysis with a whites-only sample suggests that race is not a
determining factor.

Table 12. Gay rights and church attendance
Gay rights
support

Weekly/Almost weekly

Seldom/Never

Totals

Low support

33

17

25

Moderate support

40

34

37

High support

27

50

38

Totals

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded.
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Table 13. Gay marriage and church attendance
Gay marriage position

Weekly/Almost Weekly

Seldom/Never

Totals

Support gay marriage

21

42

31

Support civil unions

25

26

26

Oppose SSU recognition

54

31

43

Totals

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded
Hypothesis 3d: In comparing individuals, those who adhere to tenets associated with
fundamentalist Christianity — a belief in a literal interpretation of the Bible, for instance — will
tend to have a lower affect for homosexuals and support more conservative positions with regard
to same-sex marriage and gay rights than those who do not.
Because, as I argued earlier in this section, church attendance measures only one aspect of
religiosity that is important to the evolution of same-sex marriage policy development, this
hypothesis seeks to test the effects of fundamentalism, or the adherence to (specifically)
Christian orthodoxy20. As with gay rights earlier, I created an additive fundamentalism index
from ANES data, based upon respondents’ answers to questions about the inerrancy of scripture,
frequency of prayer, donations to religious organizations, whether one tries to be a “good
Christian,” the belief that religion is important to daily life, and whether one is “born again.”

20 I am primarily measuring adherence to protestant orthodoxy; some, but not necessarily all, of the attributes
included in this fundamentalism index might apply to practicing Catholics.
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Within this index, we have values of 0 to 6. I collapsed this index into a three-value variable —
those who scored between 0 and 3 are labeled “low fundamentalism;” those who scored a 4 or 5
are labeled “moderate fundamentalism;” those who scored 6, about 23 percent of the sample, are
labeled “high fundamentalism.”
As Tables 14 and 15 indicate, fundamentalism has the predicted effect on both gay rights
and gay marriage opinion. Among those with low fundamentalism, just 9 percent fall into the
lowest cohort of the gay rights scale, and 19 percent oppose all SSU recognition. Meanwhile,
among those in the highest fundamentalism category, only 17 percent score in the highest cohort
of support for gay rights, and just 10 percent favor gay marriage. (Tables 16 and 17 display the
results of the same tests among whites only. We see similar results across the values of
fundamentalism. Race does not seem to play a particularly significant role.)

Table 14. Gay rights and fundamentalism
Gay rights
support

Low
fundamentalism

Moderate
fundamentalism

High
fundamentalism

Totals

Low support

9

23

45

23

Moderate
support

28

38

38

35

High support

62

39

17

42

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 20008. Values rounded
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Table 15. Gay marriage and fundamentalism
Gay marriage
position

Low
fundamentalism

Moderate
fundamentalism

High
fundamentalism

Totals

Support gay
marriage

49

31

10

32

Support civil
unions

31

28

19

27

Oppose SSU
recognition

19

40

71

40

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded

Table 16. Gay rights and fundamentalism (white respondents only)
Gay rights
support

Low
fundamentalism

Moderate
fundamentalism

High
fundamentalism

Totals

Low support

9

24

41

22

Moderate
support

28

40

42

36

High support

63

37

17

41

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded
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Table 17. Gay marriage and fundamentalism (white respondents only)
Gay marriage
position

Low
fundamentalism

Moderate
fundamentalism

High
fundamentalism

Totals

Support gay
marriage

49

27

9

30

Support civil
unions

31

34

21

30

Oppose SSU
recognition

20

39

70

40

Total

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded
The question, then, is not so much whether fundamentalism has an effect, but rather, what
effect does it have independent of church attendance? In other words, how does fundamentalism
interact with church attendance in the formation of an individual’s position on gay rights and gay
marriage? To probe this question, I turn to a more sophisticated analytical technique:
multinomial logistic regression. As is shown in Table 18, the effects of fundamentalism are
indeed strong when church attendance is held constant. In fact, both the moderate and high
fundamentalism cohorts produce larger coefficients than do their church attendance counterparts,
for both civil unions and same-sex marriage support. Still, this analysis generates a relatively
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small pseudo R-square value, .1021.

Table 18. Gay marriage, civil unions, church attendance, and fundamentalism
Independent variables

Support civil unions

Support gay marriage

Constant

.89

1.47

Almost weekly church attendance

-.49

-.33*

Weekly church attendance

-.44*

-1.1*

Moderate fundamentalism

-.96*

-1.33*

High fundamentalism

-1.8*

-2.7*

Source: ANES 2008
*Values significant at the .05 level
Pseudo R-square = .10

Table 19. Gay marriage, civil unions, church attendance, and fundamentalism (white
respondents only)
Independent variables

Support civil union

Support gay marriage

Constant

1.03

1.58

Almost weekly church attendance

-.24

-.16

Weekly church attendance

-1.9

-.94*

Moderate fundamentalism

-.98*

-1.6*

High fundamentalism

-1.8*

-3.02*

Source: ANES 2008
* Values significant at the .05 level
Pseudo R-square = .11
Table 19 displays the results of the same test, but among only white respondents. Among
21 Fundamentalism and church attendance correlate at .41, which is below the .80 standard for multicollinearity.
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whites, the strength of church attendance diminishes slightly, while the strength of the
fundamentalism increases, particularly among those with the highest attributes of
fundamentalism. The data indicate that among white, fundamentalism plays an even greater role
in gay marriage policy determination.
As we saw in the literature review, Herek (1988) and Karpov (2002) argue that it is not
just religiosity that affects gay rights policy, but ideologically conservative religiosity (and, in
Herek's case, adherence to orthodoxy as well). Returning to multinomial logistic regression, I run
the same analysis as before, only adding ideology as an intervening variable. With the least
frequent category of church attendance, the lowest cohort of fundamentalism, and ideological
liberalism held constant, we get the results shown in Tables 20 and 21.

Table 20. Gay marriage, civil unions, church attendance, fundamentalism, and ideology
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Independent variables

Support for civil unions

Support for gay
marriage

Constant

1.4

2.5

Almost weekly church
attendance

-.69*

-.68*

Weekly church attendance

-.40

-1.3*

Moderate fundamentalism

-1.3*

-1.9*

High fundamentalism

-2.1*

-2.9*

Moderate ideology

-.43

-.13

Conservative ideology

-.19

-.54*

Source: ANES 2008
* Values significant at the .05 level
Pseudo R-square = .12
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Table 21. Gay marriage, civil unions, church attendance, fundamentalism, ideology (white
respondents only)
Independent variables

Support for civil unions

Support for gay
marriage

Constant

1.79

2.85

Almost weekly church
attendance

-.46

-.19

Weekly church attendance

.08

-.50

Moderate fundamentalism

-1.34*

-2.96*

High fundamentalism

-2.50*

-2.1*

Moderate ideology

.51

-.40

Conservative ideology

-.57

-1.11*

Source: ANES 2008
*Values significant at the .05 level
Pseudo R-square = .12
Within the entire sample, the attendance and fundamentalism variables continue to do the
lion’s share of explanatory work. In fact, ideology is not statistically significant to the question of
civil unions support in this analysis, and only conservatism — but not moderate ideology —
impacts gay marriage opinion when attendance and fundamentalism are held constant. (Among
whites, fundamentalism and conservatism generate large, statistically significant variables in
determining marriage opinion; with civil union opinion as the dependent variable value,
fundamentalism is the opinion driver.)
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Hypothesis 3e: In comparing individuals, those who profess confidence in religious
organizations will be more likely to oppose liberal SSU policies than those that do not.
Among those who profess “strong confidence” in churches and religious organizations,
76 percent consider homosexual sexual conduct to be always or usually morally wrong (70
percent believe it to be “always wrong;” see Figure 6); among those with “little or no”
confidence in religious groups, 43 percent hold that view. Meanwhile, 73 percent of those in the
high confidence cohort oppose same-sex marriage, whereas just 42 percent of those professing
lower confidence in churches do. (The correlation between fundamentalism, which in this case is
based on self-identification, and church confidence in the GSS sample is .23.) We get similar
results when the sample is restricted to white respondents.
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Figure 6. Morality of gay sex by confidence in religious organizations

Multinomial logistic regression analyses show that, both among whites and among the
entire GSS sample, the high confidence in religious institutions variable retains significance after
controlling for church attendance, although high attendance generates larger coefficients.
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Table 22. Gay marriage, church attendance, and confidence in religious organizations
Independent variables

Support for gay marriage

Constant

.7

Rare church attendance

-.34

Almost weekly church attendance

-.57*

Weekly church attendance

-1.6

Somewhat high confidence in religious organizations

-.06

High confidence in religious organizations

-.77*

Source: GSS 2008.
* Values significant at the .05 level
Pseudo R-square = .09
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Table 23. Gay marriage, church attendance, and confidence in religious organizations (white
respondents only)
Independent variables

Support for gay marriage

Constant

.77

Rare church attendance

-.39

Almost weekly church attendance

-.57*

Weekly church attendance

-1.55*

Somewhat high confidence in religious organizations

-.08

High confidence in religious organizations

-.92*

Source: GSS 2008.
* Values significant at the .05 level
Pseudo R-square = .10

These data add further weight to the hypothesis above: Even controlling for the frequency
of church attendance, those who profess greater confidence in religious institutions are more
likely to oppose same-sex marriage. This tendency is marginally greater among whites than the
whole sample population.

Hypothesis 4: Authoritarianism & tolerance
This next section builds off of — though does not seek to recreate — Hetherington and
Weiler’s work on authoritarianism and its relationship to social issues. Authoritarians, they
contend, have a greater tendency to see the world in “black and white” and have a stronger need
for order (2009: 3). This preference for order and a heightened sense of threat correlate not just
with anti-gay rights beliefs, but also anti-black and hawkish foreign policy positions.
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Importantly, they argue that the key to understanding changes in opinion does not lie with those
who score high in authoritarianism — their positions on issues remain relatively constant.
Rather, they argue, it is those with low and moderate levels of authoritarianism whose views shift
as the perception of threat increases (2009: 119).
The following tests will explore the relationship of concepts associated with
authoritarianism and gay rights and gay marriage opinion.

Hypothesis 4a: In comparing individuals, those who stake out hawkish positions in
matters of foreign policy and national defense — supporting the war in Iraq, increases in defense
spending, or the torture of suspected terrorists — will be more likely to oppose liberal policies
regarding gay civil rights, and will be more likely to have lower affect toward gays and lesbians
than those who take more dovish positions on foreign policy issues.
To test this hypothesis, I created an additive index drawn from ANES data that is
comprised of respondents’ answers to questions on: whether the Iraq War was worth the cost;
whether they favor increasing defense spending; whether they favor increasing funding for the
war on terror; what they believe is the likelihood of a terrorist attack within the next year;
whether they favor torturing suspected terrorists; whether they favor a deadline for withdrawing
American troops from Iraq; and their affect toward Muslims. As with previous indexes, that
responses are broken down into values coded “high,” “moderate,” and “low.”
As predicted, those who score high in hawkishness tend to have lower levels of affect
toward homosexuals; in fact, in a dummy regression analysis, both tested values of
hawkishness— moderate and high — produce statistically significant coefficients of -10.8 and
-22.2, respectively, and generate an adjusted R-square value of .08.
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More importantly, hawkishness has a rather striking effect on gay rights and gay marriage
opinion, which is displayed in the cross-tabulation analyses shown in Tables 24 through 27. In
Tables 24 and 25, we see the relationship between gay rights support and hawkishness with the
entire ANES sample and among white respondents only. In both cases, as hawkishness increases,
gay rights support decreases. In Table 25, specifically, we see that the relationship between
hawkishness and gay rights support does appear to be affected by race. Among the entire sample,
60 percent of those coded as having low hawkishness fall into the highest gay rights cohort;
among whites, 74 percent do so. In Table 26, we see that, among those with low levels of
hawkishness, 51 percent support permitting gays to marry; among those in the highest
hawkishness cohort, just 28 percent do. Here again, we see that race appears to play some role:
Among whites with low hawkishness characteristics, 64 percent support gay marriage, 10
percentage points more than the entire sample population.

Table 24. Gay rights and hawkishness and perception of threat
Gay rights
support

Low
hawkishness

Moderate
hawkishness

High
hawkishness

Totals

Low support

11

18

28

32

Moderate
support

29

34

39

27

High support

60

48

33

40

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded
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Table 25. Gay rights and hawkishness and perception of threat (white respondents only)
Gay rights
support

Low
hawkishness

Moderate
hawkishness

High
hawkishness

Totals

Low support

2

14

27

17

Moderate
support

24

31

38

33

High support

74

55

35

50

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded

Table 26. Gay marriage and hawkishness and perception of threat
Gay marriage
position

Low
hawkishness

Moderate
hawkishness

High
hawkishness

Totals

Support gay
marriage

51

43

28

40

Support civil
unions

20

24

27

24

Oppose SSU
recognition

29

33

45

36

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded
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Table 27. Gay marriage and hawkishness and perception of threat (white respondents only)
Gay marriage
position

Low
hawkishness

Moderate
hawkishness

High
hawkishness

Totals

Support gay
marriage

68

48

26

42

Support civil
unions

18

27

30

31

Oppose SSU
recognition

17

24

44

27

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded

Hypothesis 4b: In comparing individuals, those who have a lower affect toward feminists,
African Americans, Hispanics, and other groups will also have a lower affect toward
homosexuals, and will be more likely to take positions opposing gay civil rights and gay
marriage than those with a higher affect toward these groups.
To test this hypothesis, I constructed a multivariate regression analysis using the ANES’
gay thermometer as the dependent variable and similar thermometers that measure affect toward
Hispanics, blacks, illegal immigrants, atheists, feminists, and Muslims as independent variables.
By running a multivariate analysis, we can assess the strength of these variables after controlling
for the others, and develop a better view of the relationships between affect toward gays and
affect toward other sometimes disparaged racial and cultural minority groups.
In Table 28, we see that affect toward atheists, Muslims, and feminists has the strongest
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relationship with affect toward homosexuals. Looking at this through the theoretical prism of
authoritarianism, this is none too surprising. After all, those who may feel threatened by the
changing social norms associated with homosexuality may also feel threatened by the
prominence of Islam on the world stage, given that the US is engaged in two wars in
predominantly Muslim countries, was attacked by Muslims on 11 September 2001, and is
currently dealing with the ramifications of a possible nuclear regime in Iran. Also, those who
may find homosexuals threatening might also be expected to have lower affect toward atheists,
who challenge traditional religious conceptions, and feminists, who challenge gender norms.
Moreover, illegal immigrants — who tend to be perceived as Hispanic — can be similarly
viewed as a threat, because they speak different languages and come from different cultures, and,
not inconsequentially, because they are sometimes blamed for the inability of US residents to
find jobs, especially during difficult economic times. The immigration issue, particularly, was
heating up in the year in 2008, the year in which this survey was taken; thus, it is not surprising
that illegal immigrants may be viewed as a threat.
It is noteworthy that affect toward blacks had the weakest relationship to affect toward
gays, and this too fits with the authoritarian conception: The black civil rights battles are a
generation removed, which, perhaps, indicates that blacks are no longer as threatening. I should
note, too, that although blacks are said to have greater authoritarian tendencies, removing them
and other non-whites from the analysis does not produce remarkably different coefficients.
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Table 28. Gay thermometer, Hispanic thermometer, black thermometer, illegal immigrants
thermometer, Muslims thermometer, atheists thermometer, and feminists thermometer
Independent variables

Gay thermometer

Constant

-.003

Hispanics thermometer

.13*

Blacks thermometer

.07*

Illegal immigrants thermometer

.14*

Muslims thermometer

.19*

Atheists thermometer

.28*

Feminists thermometer

.17*

Source: ANES 2008
* Values significant at the .05 level
Adjusted R-square = .50
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Table 29. Gay thermometer, Hispanic thermometer, black thermometer, illegal immigrants
thermometer, Muslims thermometer, atheists thermometer, and feminists thermometer (white
respondents only)
Independent variables

Gay thermometer

Constant

-1.04

Hispanics thermometer

.17*

Blacks thermometer

.08*

Illegal immigrants thermometer

.14*

Muslims thermometer

.15*

Atheists thermometer

.30*

Feminists thermometer

.20*

Source: ANES 2008
* Values significant at the .05 level
Adjusted R-square = .53

In Tables 30 through 32 below, I present cross-tabulation analyses exploring the
relationship between gay rights opinion and affect toward Muslims, atheists, and feminists. In all
three analyses, we see that as affect increases, so too does the percentage of respondents who fall
within the highest gay rights support category.
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Table 30. Gay rights and Muslim affect
Gay rights
support

Low Muslim
affect

Moderate
Muslim affect

High Muslim
affect

Totals

Low support

29

18

16

21

Moderate
support

38

31

30

33

High support

33

51

54

45

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded

Table 31. Gay rights and atheist affect
Gay rights
support

Low atheist
affect

Moderate atheist
affect

High atheist
affect

Totals

Low support

27

19

15

21

Moderate
support

38

33

23

33

High support

35

48

61

45

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded
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Table 32. Gay rights and feminist affect
Gay rights
support

Low feminist
affect

Moderate
feminist affect

High feminist
affect

Totals

Low support

24

18

17

21

Moderate
support

36

32

30

33

High support

40

51

53

45

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded

The results are the most pronounced with the Muslim and atheists variables: Of those
who feel the most coolly toward atheists, just 35 percent have high support for gay rights, while
61 percent of those expressing the highest affect toward atheists support liberal gay rights
policies. Similarly, whereas only 33 percent of those who rated Muslims the most coolly have
high levels of gay rights support, 54 percent of those in the highest affect cohort do so.
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Hypothesis 4c: In comparing individuals, those who voice place greater emphasis on the
maintenance of social order, as opposed to civil rights, will be more likely to oppose liberal SSU
and gay rights policies.
Using GSS data, I constructed a “social order” additive index to measure tolerance
toward disruptions in societal norms and affinity for order; these data are meant to augment the
tests run in the previous section, although they are, indeed, fruit of the same tree, and have their
bases in authoritarian conceptions of how individuals come to favor or oppose policies regarding
culture war issues.
In constructing this index, I drew from several aspects of the social order paradigm,
particularly free speech, societal conduct toward women, immigrants and racial minorities, moral
absolutism and crime and punishment, and attitudes toward child rearing. The variables included
in this index come question the GSS asked on: free speech for communists; free speech for antiAmerican Muslim clergy; capital punishment; corporal punishment for children; the absoluteness
of morality; legal immigration; affirmative action for women; and race-based affirmative action.
As with the previous indexes, the answers were tallied and collapsed into three-value grouping
— low, moderate, and high — of a new variable, “social order.”
The data shown in Figure 7 support the abovementioned hypothesis: Among those who
score lowest in preference for social order in this sample, 63 percent supported gay marriage;
among those who have the greatest preference for such order, 40 percent do so.
(Among whites with lower preferences for social order, there is an even greater
propensity to support gay marriage, 73 percent.)
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Figure 7. Gay marriage support by preference for social order

Hypothesis 5: Moral traditionalism
In this final section, I test variables associated with established cultural norms. In the
literature review’s section on individualization of society and the corresponding evolution of gay
civil rights, we saw that shifts in policy are often associated with the increased valuation of
personal choice and pursuit of pleasure over the emphasis on traditional family structures. Thus,
as postmaterial, less agrarian societies emerge, and traditionalism loses its foothold, we would
expect to find that support for new lifestyles — including homosexuality —increases, and policy
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choices follow.

Hypothesis 5a: In comparing states, those with higher rates of divorce, nonmarital
childbirth, and nonmarital different-sex cohabitation are more likely to have liberal SSU and gay
civil rights policies than those with lower rates of divorce.
Figures 8 and 9 below show the respective relationships between gay marriage and
divorce and nonmarital different-sex cohabitation rates among states.
Contrary to the stated hypothesis, the relationship between gay marriage support and
divorce rates is negative, indicating that states with higher support for gay marriage tend to have
fewer divorces. Lest this relationship be dismissed as spurious, I argue that, were the converse
true and there were a positive relationship between divorce and gay marriage support, that would
be perfectly in line with the literature suggesting that gay marriage support increases as the
traditional, nuclear family structure loses its relevance. However, this is not the case, and as
such, we must develop a new theoretical framework with which to view these data. I will discuss
this in more detail in the following chapter, but in short, I argue that this is perhaps related to the
perception of threat discussed earlier: In states with higher divorce rates, there is a greater
perception that the traditional family is under attack from secular or post-traditionalist forces,
and hence, individuals would be more likely to oppose redefinitions of the family, up to and
including gay marriage, than in states in which the traditional family is more stable and
seemingly impervious to these supposed threats.
The divorce variable produces a regression coefficient of -3.5, and an adjusted R-square
value of .11. The cohabitation variable, which shows the predicted positive relationship,
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generates a coefficient of 4.29, and an adjusted R-square value of .53. (The relationship between
gay marriage support and nonmarital birthrates is also negative, but is not statistically
significant.)

Figure 8. Gay marriage support by divorce rates
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Figure 9. Gay marriage support by nonmarital cohabitation rates
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Table 33. Gay marriage, divorce, age, education, and church attendance
Independent variable

Gay marriage support

Constant

65.6

Divorce

-1.78*

Over 65

.44

Tertiary education

.34*

Weekly church attendance

-.78*

Source: Lax and Phillips (2009: 373); Division of Vital Statistics; US Census Bureau; Newport
2006
* Values significant at the .05 level
Adjusted R-square = .90

Table 34. Gay marriage, nonmarital cohabitation, age, education, and church attendance
Independent variables

Gay marriage support

Constant

16.1

Nonmarital cohabitation

1.8*

Over 65

.55**

Tertiary education

.73*

Church attendance

-.44*

Source: Lax and Phillips (2009: 373); Badgett 2009: 196-197); US Census Bureau; Newport
2006
* Values significant at the .05 level
** Values significant at the .10 level
Adjusted R-square = .91
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Tables 33 and 34 report the results of multivariate regression analyses, in which the
relationships between gay marriage and divorce and nonmarital cohabitation rates, respectively,
are tested alongside variables controlling for age, education, and church attendance. In these
analyses, both divorce and cohabitation maintain much of their statistical strength despite the
controls.

Hypothesis 5b: In comparing states, those with a higher percentage of women in the
state legislature are more likely to favor liberal gay civil rights and SSU policies than those with
a lower percentage of women legislators.
Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between support for gay marriage and the percentage
of a state’s legislature that is female. This relationship, of course, is not causal: Having women in
the legislature does not in and of itself engender sympathy toward the plight of homosexuals and
support of pro-gay rights measures. However, in states where women have greater access to the
halls of power, where would expect that traditional gender-related mores have deteriorated, thus
precipitating higher levels of acceptance for emerging lifestyles.
As the hypothesis predicts, this relationship is positive; the women in the legislature
variable produces a statistically significant coefficient of .93, and this analysis generates an
adjusted R-square value of .51.
This variable, however, does not maintain its significance when controlling for age,
education, and church attendance. This, too, is not unexpected: As previously stated, electing
women to the legislature in greater numbers does not cause greater support for gay marriage, but
rather, the factors that allow women to gain election in higher proportions are the same that
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permit support for same-sex marriages to rise.

Figure 10. Gay marriage support by percentage of women in the legislature

Hypothesis 5c: In comparing individuals, those who voice support for the traditional,
nuclear family — in which the father is the head of household and breadwinner, and the mother
stays home with the children — and traditional norms will be less likely to support liberal gay
civil rights and SSU policies, and to have a lower affect for homosexuals, than those who do not
have such views.
Cross-tabulation analyses drawn from GSS data support the breadwinner hypothesis.
Among those who agree that a mother should stay home and a father should work, just 27
94

percent support gay marriage; among those who disagree, 57 percent support gay marriage.
Eighty-five percent of these traditionalists also believe that gay sexual activity is morally wrong,
compared to 48 percent of those who disagree with the traditional view. Clearly, those who
adhere to more traditional norms associated with the family are more likely to look askance at
new and emerging sexual and familial mores, particularly homosexuality.
Using ANES data, I created an additive index designed to measure respondents’ reactions
to changing cultural norms, particularly those affecting traditional family structures. This
additive index is formed from respondents’ answers to questions on whether new lifestyles are
injurious to society, whether there should be more emphasis on family ties, whether we should
adjust to the changing world and changing norms, and whether we should be tolerant of other
moral standards. As with the other indexes in this chapter, the results were collapsed into a threevalue variable, labeled “traditionalism,” with assigned values of “high,” “moderate,” and
“low.”22
As shown in Table 35, the data support the hypothesis. Among those with low levels of
traditionalism, 69 percent have high levels of gay rights support. Among those with high levels
of traditionalism, just 25 percent are similarly favorable to gay civil rights. This predicted
relationship holds true when testing the effect of traditionalism on gay marriage: 61 percent of
those with high levels of traditionalism support gay marriage, compared to only 18 percent of
those in the high traditionalism cohort. In Table 36, we see that when the sample is restricted to
22 Among all respondents in the ANES sample, 32 percent fall into the highest traditionalism category, and 28
percent fall into the lowest traditionalism grouping. Among whites, 40 percent are classified as high
traditionalists, while 29 percent fall into the lowest traditionalism cohort.

95

whites, as with other analyses, support for gay rights increases; here, among whites with low
levels of traditionalism, 79 percent have high levels of gay rights support, compared to 69
percent in the general ANES sample. The racial differences are seen almost entirely among those
with low levels of traditionalism; whites in this cohort seem to be more gay-rights friendly.

Table 35. Gay rights and traditionalism
Gay rights
support

Low
traditionalism

Moderate
traditionalism

High
traditionalism

Totals

Low support

10

21

31

21

Moderate
support

21

34

43

33

High support

69

44

25

45

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded
Table 36. Gay rights and traditionalism (white respondents only)
Gay rights
support

Low
traditionalism

Moderate
traditionalism

High
traditionalism

Totals

Low support

6

17

31

19

Moderate
support

15

34

43

32

High support

79

50

26

49

Totals

100

100

100

100

Source: ANES 2008. Values rounded
Table 37 reports the results of a multinomial logistic regression analysis that looks at the
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effect of traditionalism on gay marriage and civil union support when controlling for ideology,
age, education, and church attendance. Here, we see that both tested values of traditionalism
maintain their statistical significance even as education and ideology falter. High traditionalism
maintains higher coefficients than weekly church attendance for both gay marriage and civil
unions opinion, after controlling for ideology, age, and education.
When the sample is restricted to whites, the strength of traditionalism becomes evident:
with gay marriage, traditionalism succeeds with ideology, age, and religiosity held constant. All
other variables, save the oldest age cohort, fail to meet statistical significance.
The strength of traditionalism in these analyses is quite remarkable, and suggestive of the
idea that no matter one’s age, ideology, or even religiosity, the most powerful explainer of gay
marriage opinion is the degree to which one ascribes to norms associated with the traditional
family23.

23 To guard against multicollinearity, I performed postestimation tests for the independent variables including in this
last series of tests. None approached the .80 standard. The highest level of traditionalism and the highest age
cohort, for instance, produced a P-value of 0, as did high traditionalism and high-church attendance. The
youngest age cohort and liberal ideology produced the highest P-value in my postestimation tests, .52; while
there is significant overlap within these variables, it is not nearly enough to cast aspersions on the results of this
analysis.

97

Table 37. Gay marriage, civil unions, traditionalism, ideology, age, education, church
attendance
Independent variables

Support civil unions

Support gay marriage

Constant

-.38

1.4

Moderate traditionalism

-1.4*

-1.1*

High traditionalism

-1.1*

-1.6*

Moderate ideology

.09

-.33

Liberal ideology

-.01

-.34

31 to 50

-.16

-.3*

51 to 64

-.77*

-1.4*

Over 65

-.13

-1.2*

Graduated high school/ Some college

-.02*

.1

Graduated college

.39

.4

Almost weekly church attendance

-.24

-.8*

Weekly church attendance

-.77*

-1.3*

Source: ANES 2008
* Values significant at the .05 level
Pseudo R-square = .11
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Table 38. Gay marriage, civil unions, traditionalism, ideology, age, education, and church
attendance (white respondents only)
Independent variables

Support civil unions

Support gay marriage

Constant

2.04

3.21

Moderate traditionalism

-2.7*

-2.4*

High traditionalism

-2.6*

-2.6*

Moderate ideology

-.34

-.62

Liberal ideology

-.43

-.76

31 to 50

-.11

-.22

51 to 64

-.34

-.92

Over 65

-.29

-1.23**

Graduated high school/ Some college

-.81

.46

Graduated college

1.61

1.56

Almost weekly church attendance

-.60

-.62

Weekly church attendance

-.004

-.44

Source: ANES 2008
* Values significant at the .05 level
**Values significant at the .10 level
Pseudo R-square = .12
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
Attempting to pin down any one “culprit” as the variable that wholly explains gay rights and gay
marriage debates within the US — or anywhere else for that matter — is surely a fool’s errand.
The cultural, religious, sociological, and demographical underpinnings of this culture war issue
cannot, and should not, be overly boiled down for the sake of simplicity. However, the research
presented in Chapter 4 allows us to infer at least some of the relationships associated with gay
rights issues, both on statewide and individual levels, and to some degree, begin to piece together
the puzzle and gain an understanding of how these variables interact.
Before discussing these results in greater detail, I would like to make a quick point about
what this research did not cover extensively: namely, institutions. As mentioned in the literature,
some scholars (Kollman 2007, Lax and Phillips 2009) have found little support for institutional
explanations. Specifically, Lax and Phillips argue that there is “little evidence that state political
institutions affect policy responsiveness or congruence” (2009: 367). When such non-congruence
happens, they continue, it is generally in a more conservative direction. Thus, from their
research, one could conclude that a study of state-level opinion is a study of state policy choices.
Yet we know that, at least in some cases, institutions, and particularly courts, have played
a role, regardless of whether the courts’ actions were in line with popular sentiment. Vermont’s
decision a decade ago to allow same-sex civil unions stemmed from a court ruling. So did
Massachusetts’ decision to enact gay marriage in 2003, Connecticut’s extension of marriage
rights in 2008, and Iowa’s endorsement of same-sex marriage in 2009. We also know, from
Werum and Winders’ research, that pro-gay activists have relied upon local governments, state
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legislatures and state courts for the bulk of their successes, while anti-gay forces found success in
referenda (2001: 398-402). We have seen this dynamic playing out recently: In 2008, California
voters overturned a court ruling that ordered the state to grant same-sex couples marriage
licenses. In 2009, Maine voters overturned a legislative act that legalized gay marriage. That
same year, the Iowa Supreme Court legalized gay marriage, and Washington D.C.’s City Council
took the first step toward doing likewise.
This paper does not explore this aspect of SSU policy development in great detail,
primarily because there are only a handful of such court actions with which to work, and
consequently, any derivative analysis would be necessarily be qualitative, requiring examinations
of the individual court backgrounds and cases that facilitated those rulings.
Instead, I build primarily from Lax and Phillips’ argument that policy tends to adhere
with public opinion and research the drivers of public opinion. In the remainder of this chapter, I
will discuss the results of my research and its implications for our understanding of gay rights
issue development, and also offer suggestions for future scholarship on this subject. In the next
chapter, I will conclude with some thoughts of what this research tells us about the future of the
gay civil rights movement.
Liberalism
It is hardly surprising that the link between affect for homosexuals and support for gay
rights is quite strong. After all, those who felt the “warmest” toward gays and lesbians would be
expected to support for more liberal policies, and those who professed to being “cool” toward
homosexuals would not seem likely to want to expand rights. But how much does this self101

reported affect matter?
The data indicate that the answer is “quite a bit.” The positive relationship between affect
toward gays and lesbians and support for gay rights policies, including marriage, is apparent: As
affect increases, so does the likelihood that one supports gay rights more.
There are, however, a few things worthy of further discussion. One is the role of civil
unions. This “compromise” position between affording gay and lesbian couples full relationship
recognition and no recognition maintains support at between 16 and 33 percent in the four affect
cohorts tested in the last chapter, cresting among those in the middle affect categories and
bottoming out at the ends, with 19 percent support among those with low affect and 16 percent
support among those with high affect. We could theorize that, among those with the lowest
degrees of affect, civil unions offer a lesser, though permissible, degree of recognition, and that is
all that these individuals are willing to abide. And in some cases, that is likely true. However, in
each of these groups, more people support gay marriage than mere civil unions. While support
for gay marriage and support for the broader category of SSU recognition are both linked to
affect toward homosexuals, how this variable interacts with respondents’ support of civil unions
in lieu of gay marriage is not clear from the data.
These results do show promise for gay rights advocates. Only among those in the lowest
quantile of affect does SSU recognition not reach a majority status (and even then, 44 percent
favor affording gay couples some or all legal rights). As Fiorina et. al. note, ANES time-series
data show a steady growth in affect toward homosexuals between 1984 and 2004, particularly
among those younger than 50 (2005: 113, 124). If affect continues to increase, support for gay
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marriage and SSU recognition will also likely rise. It is not difficult to imagine that percentage
increasing significantly over the next decade. Although the ANES cumulative data file does not
include a question on gay marriage, it does include a question on whether or not gays should be
protected from discrimination. Between 1988 and 2004, the percentage answering affirmatively
rose from 54 percent to 75 percent. Between 1992 and 2004, the percentage of those who voiced
support for gay adoption likewise increased substantially, from 38 percent to 58 percent, and the
percentage who supported permitting gays to serve in the military rose from 59 percent to 81
percent. By any measure, America has become more gay friendly over the last generation. It has
done so among all ideological groupings: among self-identified conservatives, for instance, the
percentage that supported granting gays and lesbians legal protection from discrimination
increased from 47 percent in 1988 to 66 percent in 2004.
The question is whether this trend continues, stagnates, or reverses in coming years.
Although support for gay rights has risen across the ideological spectrum, the highest levels of
support for gay rights and, particularly, gay marriage is intertwined with liberalism —
importantly, with regard to gay marriage, especially, the defining attribute is liberalism, as
moderates and conservatives tend to have similar levels of support. Similar percentages of
conservatives, moderates, and liberals have low support for gay rights; among both moderates
and liberals, majorities fall into the highest category of gay rights support. (Conservatives are
more closely split between those with moderate and high support for gay rights.)
As Kollman (2007) has argued, gay marriage tends to be an elite-driven issue, and
conservative politicians tend to oppose gay rights more so than do liberal politicians. But even
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President Obama, perhaps in an effort to diffuse culture-war issues in an economically centric
election, publicly opposed gay marriage during the 2008 campaign, though he did support the
extension of civil unions and the repeal of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. And we do see a
connection between support for his candidacy and a state’s support for gay marriage (although,
again, this is by no means a causal relationship) and tendency to enact policies recognizing samesex unions.
Liberalism, by itself, is an overly simplistic explanation. The expansion of gay civil rights
has long been identified with liberal politicians, and opposition to those policies associated with
Republicans, for decades. Under the George W. Bush administration, Republicans rallied social
conservatives to their banner with calls for a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. In
the current Congress, Democrats have proposed repealing both the federal Defense of Marriage
Act (Whittemore 2009), which was passed by a Republican Congress (and signed by Democratic
President Bill Clinton) in the 1990s, and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the policy on gays in the
military (Lochhead 2008).
Thus, it is unsurprising that the link between gay rights policy and liberalism exists;
indeed, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that partisan divisions on culture war issues,
including gay rights, stem from party sorting based on authoritarianism, a claim I will discuss
more later in this chapter.
But for this research, the primary role of ideology is to serve as a control variable for tests
on other variables. The interesting thing here is not so much that liberalism works, but how it
interacts with other potential explainers.
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Demographics: Age, education & urbanization
Among individuals, the relationship between age and gay rights support is striking. For
instance, it is only among those older than 65 that a majority opposes any recognition of samesex couples. Among those under 50, clear majorities have high support for gay rights. Among
those 18 to 30, nearly 80 percent support SSU recognition, and 61 percent support full marriage
rights. In the next chapter, I will discuss in more depth the central question this raises for gay and
anti-gay rights activists: is the relationship between gay rights and age a matter of socialization,
or something that evolves over the course of one’s life cycle. If the answer is the former, that
would suggest that, as older voters exit the voter pool, voters will become decidedly more gay
friendly, and consequently, the full adaptation of gay marriage is perhaps only a matter of time.
There does appear to be support in the literature for the socialization hypothesis: Those
who were between 18 and 30 years old during the 2008 ANES would have been born sometime
between 1978 and 1990. As discussed in the literature, the 1990s were a remarkable period for
the mainstreaming of gay rights and gay culture. Brewer (2003) argues that, with increasing
public awareness of gay rights came increasing acceptance; drawing from Hetherington and
Weiler’s arguments that the much anti-gay sentiment is rooted in threat, we can surmise, quite
simply, that these younger voters do not feel threatened gays and lesbians because they are not
seen as posing a threat to the social order.
The link between educations and the liberalization of gay rights appears similarly robust:
Only 24 percent of those who have graduated college oppose all SSU recognition, whereas 45
percent of those in the lowest education cohort do so. Fifty-eight percent of college graduates fall
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into the highest category of gay rights support, significantly higher than the 34 percent of those
in the lowest education group. This link between education and liberal gay rights support appears
across the ideological spectrum: conservatives, moderates, and liberals who have at least
graduated high school are more amenable to gay rights and gay marriage.
With statewide data, it is noteworthy that the age variable — the percentage over 65 —
does not achieve statistical significance until we control for the percentage of those who have
received a tertiary education. The effects of education, it seems, mask the role of age. More
importantly, perhaps, after controlling for education, the age variable has a positive effect on
support for gay marriage, meaning that, if we hold education constant, states with larger elderly
populations are more likely to support gay marriage. Most certainly, this counterintuitive finding
presents fertile ground for future scholarship.
As discussed in the literature review, Weld et. al. (1996) posit a link between liberal gay
rights policies and urbanization. This would not be surprising: urban areas have long been the
epicenters of gay culture. Those who live in cities are more likely to have had encounters with
gays and lesbians, and are perhaps more apt to see them as less threatening to the social order.
Moreover, the literature suggests that urbanization offers individuals an escape of sorts from
agrarian societies that place a greater emphasis on traditional values. And on a statewide level,
this variable does seem to have a relationship with gay marriage opinion, though after controlling
for age and education, it loses its significance. The role of urbanization, it appears, is that young
and educated individuals are drawn to urban centers, and these individuals are thus more likely to
support the liberalization of SSU policy.
106

Those who live in rural areas are more likely to oppose gay civil rights, in keeping with
the urbanization hypothesis. However, the differentiation among urbanites and suburbanites
exists only among whites, and not among the entire GSS sample. This finding is borne out by the
literature, specifically, Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) argument that urban blacks tend to have
smaller support for gay rights, thus obscuring the differences between urban-dwellers and those
in the suburbs.

Religiosity
There is no question from the data that religious service attendance has a profound impact
on both individual- and state-level SSU policy opinion. It is certainly one of the strongest
opinion determinants on both opinion and actual policy. On a state level, it produces the
strongest coefficients after controlling for age and education (though those variables maintain
their viability). On its own, church attendance produces an adjusted R-square value of .82;
combined with age and education, that value is .88. Similarly, the percentage of a state’s
population that considers themselves evangelicals has a statistically significant effect on SSU
policy, though it is not as strong an opinion driver as church attendance, which boasts a
coefficient that is three times higher than the evangelicals variable. More devout and more
evangelical states are certainly less gay-rights friendly. More devout individuals, too, are less
likely to support gay rights and gay marriage.
Although church attendance is perhaps the most widely recognized measurement of
religiosity, the results of the evangelism test above and the literature reviewed in Chapter 2
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indicate that there is more to the story. After all, there are liberal and gay-friendly religious
denominations within the US; a frequent attendee of one of these may not be expected to oppose
gay rights, as might be expected of those who are devotees of more conservative traditions. Thus,
I tested attributes associated with protestant orthodoxy and adherence to fundamentalism. The
data support the hypothesis; even holding church attendance constant, fundamentalism produces
statistically significant negative coefficients for both gay marriage and civil unions support. In
fact, fundamentalism produces stronger coefficients than does church attendance, even after
holding ideology constant.
Also drawing from Karpov (2002), I hypothesized that those who professed confidence in
religious organizations would be less likely to support gay marriage. This, too, is supported by
the data, even after holding church attendance constant. (The effect is somewhat stronger among
whites than the population at large.)
While church attendance is indeed associated with decreased support for gay rights and
gay marriage, this relationship is augmented by adherence to orthodoxy and professed trust in
religious institutions. This is, of course, somewhat intuitive: those who go beyond weekly church
attendance and try to absorb and practice the teachings of their religious traditions — especially
if those traditions are conservative and teach adherence to orthodoxy — would be more likely to
oppose rights for those who they believe engage in immoral behaviors.

Authoritarianism & tolerance
In keeping with Hetherington and Weiler (2009), I find that those who have a high level
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of foreign policy hawkishness and the perception of threat are considerably less likely to support
same-sex marriage and gay rights than those without those characteristics. This relationship
appears to be more pronounced among whites than among the entire population, in that whites
with fewer hawkishness attributes appear more willing to extend rights to gays and lesbians.
Notably, I find the stronger links between affect toward homosexuals and affect toward Muslims,
atheists, and feminists, than I do between affect toward gays and affect toward blacks and
Hispanics (though these relationships are statistically significant). Under this theoretical
construct, it seems, those who find Muslims, atheists, and feminists more threatening to their
existing social order are also more likely to view homosexuals the same way, and thus have a
“cooler” affect toward gays and lesbians.
Unsurprisingly, then, those who have lower affect toward these categories of individuals
are less likely to support gay civil rights, up to and including marriage. Similarly, I find that
those who place a great deal of emphasis on the maintenance of social order are considerably less
likely to support gay marriage and gay rights than those who do not value the social order as
much.

Moral traditionalism
As with religiosity, the literature linking the liberalization of same-sex marriage policy to
the cultural deemphasizing of moral traditions, particularly those associated with gender roles
and family life, is quite robust. The premise is elegantly simple: As societies become
increasingly individualized, the importance of traditional family structures is subsumed by the
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development of personal happiness; along the way, gender roles — men working as the home’s
primary breadwinners, women staying home and caring for the children — and the role of
marriage lose at least some of their cultural primacy. Therefore, we would expect that as the
markers of traditional family and gender roles decline, societies will grow more amendable to
new lifestyles and become more supportive of gay rights and gay marriage policies.
And yet, our state-level data show that the divorce rates actually has a negative
relationship with gay rights and gay marriage opinion, which at first blush, would seem to run
contrary to our expectations (and certainly, counter to the stated hypothesis). However, the
literature on authoritarianism and threat perception may offer us an explanation: In states with
low rates of divorce, changes to the traditional family are perhaps seen as more of a threat, which
Hetherington and Weiler might suggest would lead to more favorable views on new, emergent
lifestyles. But as these rates increase, the perceived threat to traditional norms increases, and
with it, so does opposition to these new lifestyles. Of course, this explanation requires more
rigorous scholarship between any definitive conclusions could be reached, and without that, this
relationship must be treated skeptically.
In keeping with my hypothesis, however, an increase in nonmarital cohabitation —
“living in sin,” if you will — is linked to an increase in support for gay marriage. In this case, it
seems that as the institution of marriage is devalued — or at least, at it is no longer viewed as a
prerequisite to cohabitation — there is a greater propensity to grant gays and lesbians access to
this institution. This variable succeeds after controlling for age, education, and church attendance
(theoretically, younger, more educated, and less religious people would be less likely to approve
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of nonmarital cohabitation).
Reconciling this finding with the finding on divorce rates — one indicates that gay
marriage is linked to a devaluation of marriage, the other seemingly contradicts that view — is
beyond the scope is this thesis. More research is needed.
The popularity of gay marriage does, however, appear to be linked to a deemphasis on
traditional gender roles, as indicated by the fact that states in which higher percentages of women
are elected to the legislature are more approving of gay marriage. Among individuals, too, those
who prefer traditional gender roles and cultural norms are similarly disinclined to support gay
rights. Sixty-nine percent of those who low levels of traditionalism have high support for gay
rights (79 percent when the sample is whites only). Traditionalism has a negative pull on gay
marriage and civil unions support even when controlling for age, education, ideology, and church
attendance, all variables that we might expect to be linked to traditionalism.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
In the previous two chapters, I tested and discussed a number of hypotheses associated in the
literature with the development of gay marriage policy and the liberalization of gay civil rights,
both among individuals and in states. And, for the most part, the tests supported the hypotheses.
(This was not without exception: divorce rates had results opposite than the hypotheses
predicted.) Broadly, we saw relationships between gay marriage and support for gay rights and
ideology, age, education, religiosity, authoritarianism, tolerance traditionalism, and urbanization.
However, these relationships were not of equal import. In this conclusion, I will discuss
what this research tells us about how gay rights opinion and policies liberalize, and offer some
thoughts on what it adds to the literature of the development of gay rights policy, particularly gay
marriage, as well as what my findings auger for the future of gay rights policy development (or,
at least, the evolution of gay rights opinion).
Throughout this paper, the variables that have succeeded perhaps the strongest are those
associated with high religiosity — particularly high-frequency religious service attendance and
those who have high levels of fundamentalism — and moral traditionalism. This is hardly
surprising, based on what we know of the gay rights literature. Indeed, many, if not most, of the
arguments against the legal sanctioning of homosexual relationships are rooted in either religious
prohibitions (Staver 2004) or in fears that granting government approval to such relationships
would undermine heterosexual families (Badgett 2009: 5-6, 65). But even in the case of the
latter, the argument, if versed in secular terminology, is nonetheless derived from a religiously
based conception of what a family should look like.
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Given this, we would expect that those with characteristics of high religiosity — the most
frequent levels of church attendance and adherence to values associated with fundamentalism
and evangelicalism — would be most likely to oppose the liberalization of gay civil rights and
gay marriage, and that states with the highest percentages of these individuals will have lower
support for these policies, and, consequently, be less likely to enact them. And that is, indeed,
what we find.
However, the data presented here do not appear to adhere with what Kollman (2007: 354)
reported about SSU recognition in Europe: Among European policy adapter states — those that
had granted same-sex couples some recognition — those that more religious, such as Belgium,
were more likely to grant gays the right to marry, while those that were more secular, such as
France, would tend to opt for a lesser form of recognition, including civil unions and domestic
partnerships. However, in the US, the least two religious states (as measured by weekly religious
service attendance), Vermont and New Hampshire, both have gay marriage policies (Newport
2006). Perhaps, this is because the US has a relatively small percentage of adapter states, and as
more states expand SSU recognitions, they will differentiate themselves as we see in Europe;
under this framework, we would argue that the non-religious states would be the first to expand
rights, which was certainly the case with Vermont, a state that granted recognitions to same-sex
couples a decade before it bestowed them with full marriage rights.
This question, on the differentiation of support between gay marriage and civil unions in
the US, has not been thoroughly explored in this paper. Future research may allow us to pinpoint
the reasons why one would choose to support civil unions but not gay marriage; in this research,
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support for civil unions appears to be something of a compromise position between those who
want to grant gay couples full rights and those who would not recognize their relationships at all.
And yet, the reasons why one might select the compromise position over full rights position have
not themselves itself clear in this paper.
And despite Lax and Phillips’ arguments on the congruence of state gay rights policies
and public opinion, there has been no detailed examination of how states come to choose the
policies they do. With only five states (and Washington, D.C.) affording gay couples marriage
rights, and another seven granting some form of lesser relationship recognition, this low N
perhaps does not allow for sophisticated quantitative analysis, though it may allow for qualitative
analysis, particularly as to the role of the courts. After all, court rulings paved the way for gay
marriage in California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Iowa; referenda, meanwhile, have
played a strong role in limiting the spread of gay marriage, specifically in Maine and California,
where voters overturned gay marriage laws and court rulings, respectively. Thus, the role of
institutions needs further analysis.
Within states, the interplay between measures of adherence to traditional norms and
support for gay marriage also warrants more detailed testing and analysis. As discussed in the
previous chapter, we see a negative relationship between divorce rates and support for gay
marriage, counter to expectations. And yet tests involving the percentage of nonmarital
cohabitators and the percentage of women in the legislature both produced results that fit my
hypotheses.
One’s level of tolerance, particularly toward groups seen as challenging the social order
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— Muslims, feminists, and atheists especially — also has an effect on gay marriage and gay
rights opinion, in keeping with Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) arguments. This finding not
only confirms this element of Hetherington and Weiler’s research, but demonstrates how this
affect relates to feelings on gay civil rights and marriage more exhaustively, and perhaps would
indicate that, as gays become seen as less of a threat, a larger percentage of Americans will be
inclined to support relationship recognition and marriage rights.
Relatedly, gay rights activists might also take comfort in the fact that demographics
appear to be working heavily in their favor: Among those under 50 years of age, and especially
among those between 18 and 30, we see high support for gay rights and gay marriage. Through
attrition, as the older — and more traditionally oriented — generations die and exit the voter
pool, the increasing support for (and affect toward) homosexuals shown in the data looks only to
continue increases, thus making it entirely likely that, unless anti-gay rights activists can
convince future generations that gay marriage will infringe upon societal cohesion, state gay
marriage policies may become the norm, rather than outliers, in the foreseeable future. Even
since 2004, when Republicans championed an anti-gay marriage amendment to the US
Constitution, we have seen the saliency of this issue appear to dissipate: opposition to gay rights
was not a central plank of John McCain’s platform; and while court decisions regarding gay
marriage in California brought an outcry from religious conservatives and an ultimately
successful effort to overturn the court’s ruling, it did not manifest in another full-throated bid to
amend the US Constitution. Similarly, recent Democratic proposals to abolish “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” and the federal Defense of Marriage Act have not been the clarion call of conservative
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opposition, the way they might have been a few short years ago. Instead, conservatives have
focused primarily on non-moral issues in their opposition to President Obama, particularly issues
of taxes, spending, and health care reform. The issue of homosexuality has, in short, seemed to
lose some of its divisive power.
The central question is whether this demographic relationship is a matter of socialization
or life cycle; that is to say, whether individuals are more likely to become more conservative on
gay rights issues as they become older, or whether, because they came of age at a time when
homosexuality was more culturally acceptable, they will, throughout their lives, see it as
something of a non-issue, and be more inclined to extend civil rights protections to homosexuals.
The data also indicate that younger individuals are less likely to have high levels of
fundamentalism and traditionalism and to attend church frequently than are their peers. Among
those 65 and older, just 16 percent fall into the lowest cohort of traditionalism; among those in
the youngest age cohort, 40 percent do. Similarly, 69 percent of those who are 65 and older
attend church frequently, while just 40 percent of those who are 18 to 30 do so. More notably,
perhaps, just 13 percent of those who are 18 to 30 have high levels of fundamentalism, while 29
percent of those in the oldest age cohort do. Forty-one percent of those in the lowest age cohort
score low on the fundamentalism scale, while roughly half of the percentage of those in the 65
and older cohort do so.
The literature on political socialization tends to support the notion that younger persons’
more liberal attitudes toward homosexuality are the product of pre-adult socialization. In a study
of adolescents in a presidential election year, for instance, David O. Sears and Nicholas A.
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Valentino argue that “periodic political events catalyze preadult socialization, generating
predispositions that persist into later life stages” (1997: 45). This is not an apples-to-apples
comparison, of course; Sears and Valentino studied socialization on issues associated with a
specific campaign, and report that political issues peripheral to the campaign largely fell to the
wayside. Richard G. Niemi and Barbara I. Sobieszek (1977) argue that while pre-adult
socialization does occur, that does not mean that mature adults do not change their positions. M.
Kent Jennings writes that, in his study of 1960s protesters, “generational persistence, while real,
is subjected to stringent tests over time” (1987: 380). Duane F. Alwin and Jon A. Krosnick find
support for the hypothesis that younger adults have less stable attitudes, but these become more
stable with age (1991: 169).
Importantly, Marc Hooghe and Dietland Stolle claim that “socialisation effects tend to be
more limited in scope during one’s adult life, and … the adherence to core values and identities
is relatively stable during the life cycle. Of course changes in attitudes do occur during adulthood
… . However, in general these changes do not interfere with the basic pattern, established early
in the life cycle. The most important foundation for political attitudes is shaped at a relatively
early age … ” (2003: 49).
Thomas C. Wilson sums up the literature on generational tolerance toward minorities
thusly: “Studies have shown that younger people typically are less prejudiced than are older
people … . This was originally attributed to a tendency for people to become less tolerant and
more prejudiced as they age … . But more recent studies have found no evidence of this aging
effect and imply instead that recent cohorts are not only less prejudiced than earlier cohorts but
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tend to remain so as they grow older” (1996: 254).
However, Wilson’s original research should provide a glimmer of hope for anti-gay rights
activists. In assessing the generational attitudes toward minorities, he concludes, “The findings I
have presented in this study are, to my knowledge, the first to who that the youngest American
adults are actually more prejudiced than their elders, documenting a reversal in the liberalization
process among successive cohorts as it pertains to attitudes toward minorities” (1996: 270).
In other words, just because one generation is more tolerant of a minority group, that does
not necessarily mean that the generation that follows will be even more tolerant. To extrapolate
from affect toward minorities to affect toward homosexuals: even if today’s 18 to 30 year olds
are be more tolerant of homosexuals and supportive of gay rights throughout their lives than
were their parents and grandparents, that does not necessarily mean that their children or
grandchildren will be more tolerant still. It is entirely possible that, pursuant to some unforeseen
event — a fundamentalist religious revival, for instance, or perhaps some other event that causes
individuals to more strongly view homosexuals as a threat to the social order — generations that
come will be less gay friendly than modern 18 to 30 year olds, who the literature suggests will
probably maintain much of their gay friendliness throughout their lifetimes.
On the other hand, the black civil rights movement demonstrates that once rights are
extended — as they were to African Americans in the 1960s — they are not easily revoked, no
matter the changes in tolerance or affect among succeeding generations. Based on both the
literature and my research, it does seem entirely possible, if not probable, that by the time this
generation of 18 to 30 year olds reaches seniority, gays and lesbians in the US will be afforded
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some legal relationship recognition, likely full marriage rights. Once that happens, it will be very
difficult for those who oppose the extension of such rights to turn back the tide.
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Religiosity

Belgium

9

Italy

29

UK

14

Percentage that attends church weekly
Source: Eurofound

Belgium

11.9

Italy

10.2

UK

5

Percentage that belongs to religious organizations
Source: World Values Survey

Belgium

5.5

Italy

6.7

UK

6.3

Percentage that volunteers for religious organizations
Source: World Values Survey

Belgium

43.6

Italy

72.8

UK

58.3

Percentage that believes in life after death
Source: World Values Survey
121

Belgium

42.9

Italy

73.2

UK

66.9

Percentage that believes in sin
Source: World Values Survey

Belgium

61.6

Italy

78.9

UK

49.8

Percentage that prays
Source: World Values Survey

Belgium

45.4

Italy

72.1

UK

37.3

Percentage that says religion is important in their lives
Source: World Values Survey

Belgium

73.4

Italy

67.8

UK

65.3

Percentage that believes church should not influence government
Source: World Values Survey
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Belgium

27

Italy

43.5

UK

27

Percentage that agrees that churches give answers to social problems
Source: World Values Survey

Belgium

40.1

Italy

67.1

UK

34.4

Percentage that expresses confidence in churches
Source: World Values Survey

Belgium

5.4

Italy

4.9

UK

4.9

Mean score on question of whether homosexuality is justifiable (1=never/10=always)
Source: World Values Survey

Urbanization

Belgium

97.3

Italy

67.5

UK

89.2

Percentage of population that is urban (2005)
Source: Globalis
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Higher education

Belgium

56

Italy

47

UK

52

Percentage of the population aged 19 to 24 that is enrolled in higher education (1996)
Source: Eurofound

Belgium

80

Italy

73

UK

77

Percentage of 20 to 24 year olds who have completed secondary education
Source: Eurofound

Gender equality

Belgium

35.3

Italy

11.5

UK

17.9

Percentage of national Parliament that is female (2004)
Source: Globalis
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Belgium

51.6

Italy

27.6

UK

30.8

Percentage that always approves of women as single mothers
Source: World Values Survey

Moral traditionalism

Belgium

81.1

Italy

92.4

UK

66.8

Percentage that agrees that children always need a mother and father
Source: World Values Survey

Belgium

30.6

Italy

17

UK

25.9

Percentage that believes marriage is an outdated institution
Source: World Values Survey
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Belgium
(2003)

75

Italy (2002)

15

UK (1999)

53

Divorces per 100 new marriages
Source: Eurofound

Belgium

27

Italy

17

UK

43

Percentage of births that are out of wedlock (2005)
Source: Eurofound
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Source: Lax and Phillips (2009: 373)
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